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Peace-or

the End of Civilization

SWIFT MOVING world developments have taken place since
this pamphlet was completed.
We are face to face with hideous weapons of limitless and uncontrollable power in the new hydrogen bombs that today can destroy
a city like New York, a whole country-and tomorrow the world!
We have heard our Secretary of State say that under the instant
massive retaliation policy the President alone could make the decision, without consulting Congress or America's allies, to unleash
this monstrous power.
We have been informed of our government's intention to keep
the war in IndoChina going at all costs, continuing a needless
bloody struggle that could spread to world-wide proportions, and
bring the H-bomb into use.
In the face of these new and terrible dangers, the Soviet Union
has given a striking new demonstration of its will to peace in an
offer to carry further the proposals made at the Berlin Conference
for a collective security system in Europe which would eliminate
the dangers of new aggression arising from a rearmed Western
Germany. This new proposal was made in a note handed by Soviet
Foreign Minister Molotov to the United States, Great Britain and
France on March 31.
Citing the growing destructiveness of atomic and hydrogen
weapons, Mr. Molotov renewed the appeal of his government for
agreement on their prohibition. The use of such weapons, he said,
"would mean the wholesale annihilation of civilians and the destruction of big cities, the centers of present-day industry, culture
and science, including such old centers of civilization as the leading
capitals of the world."
Mr. Molotov renewed the Soviet proposal made at the Berlin
Conference for an all-European collective security treaty, Meeting the objections that it would be undesirable to have the United
States remain outside as originally contemplated, he said the Soviet
Government now sees no obstacle to the United States participating
in such a treaty.
At the same time, while reiterating the dangers of a revived
German militarism under the European Defense Community, the
note stated that, along with the establishment of an all-European
collective security system, the USSR is ready to examine the
question of its own participation in the North Atlantic Treaty
under conditions insuring its truly defensive character.
In spite of our State Department's swift rejecion of this new
offer, it cannot but make the strongest impression on the peoples
of Europe, of our own country, and the world.
When the only alternative is the road leading to the end of
civilization, dare we close the way to peace?

NEGOTIATIONS: The Way to Peace

T h e Berlin Conference
a n d After
THE GREAT and positive significance of the Berlin FourPower Foreign Ministers' Conference was in re-establishing the
principle of negotiations as the only way to settle disputes among
nations and lead the world toward peace.
The very fact that the conference was held despite the long and
determined efforts to prevent it marked a great victory for the peace
forces of the world.
And it can be counted an even greater victory that out of this
conference came the decision for the Geneva conference with the
participation of the Chinese People's Republic, on the questions of
a peace settlement for Korea and of restoring peace in Indochina.
The Big Four agreement to hold an exchange of views on disarmament, even on a limited basis, opens the way to new discussions
on reducing the terrible and wasteful burden of the armaments
and atomic race, under which ever more fiendish weapons are being
developed.
Although it is a serious matter that no agreement could be
reached on the peaceful unification of Germany, problems of European security and the Austrian treaty, many issues were clarified in
the debates on these subjects,
The conference raised sharply the grave dangers to peace of a
policy which not only keeps Germany divided, but would turn all
Europe into two opposing armed camps as the inevitable result of
the establishment of the European Defense Community* and the
remilitarization of Germany. The Soviet proposal for a fifty-year
collective security pact for all European countries focussed attention on an alternative plan under which all the countries of Europe,
regardless of differing social systems, could co-exist peacefully.
What is of the deepest concern to the American people is the
role of our own government at the conference, because every ques+See Glossary, page 61, for explanation of
and !treaties referred to in text.
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in Berlin hm a direct bearing on our own lives.
Scaetary Dulles made absolutely clear both before and during
the conference that he was not prepared to negotiate about the
one thing on which a peaceful settlement for Germany and Europe
depends-the question of rearmifig Germany through the EDC,
and on this he carried along the French and British Foreign Ministers, with whom every step was coordinated in advance.
The Eden proposal for holding all-German elections under the
control of the four powea and their troops, and on terms which
would commit a united Germany in advance to a military alliance
with the West was, in fact, the only proposal on ~ e r m a nby~ the
three Western countries. It held no answer to the main problem
of preventing renewed German aggression.
The policy of reviving German militarism, the continuation of
the arms drive and all the other aspects of the cold war and war
preparations which are already having such a disastrous effect on
American life, is no more in the interests of our country than of
the people of Europe. Our country has not known the devastation and horror of invasion of our own soil, but thousands of
American youth have died as a result of aggressive German militarism in two world wars. A third world war, fought with atomic and
hydrogen weapons of frightful power, would bring the devastation
we have not known before to America itself, to all our people, on
a scale never before dreamed of.
The voices of the peace forces of America, of all the people
who want to spare our country and the world such horrors, were
not heard at Berlin. The voices of the trade unions, awakening at
last to what the cold war policies mean to them as unemployment
and living costs soar, were not heard. The voices of millions of
ordinary 'krnericans, Negro and white, wanting to lead normal,
decent lives in an America true to its democratic traditions, were
not heard.
It was not that America, the real America, that Mr. Dulles was
representing when on the eve of the conference he unveiled the
"new look" military policy threatening instant massive atomic
retaliation against the cities of the Soviet Union and China if some
local conflict might break out which the Administration chose to
interpret as "Communist aggression."
From many quarters, questions are being raised here at home
and among America's allies as to the dreadful implications of this
policy, which would put in the hands of one man the power to
wipe out tens of millions of human lives. A great national discussion has arisen around this issue.
The Berlin Conference has already made its contribution to
that discussion. It has brought home more clearly than ever that
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there is no threat of aggression from the Soviet Union or China,
whose leaders are doing everying in their power to substitute the
conference table for force and threats of force in world affairs.
A whole series of military moves during the conference indicated that the United States, on the contrary, was placing continued
reliance on armed force rather than negotiations.
The first U.S. unit of B-47 atomic jet bombers was sent to
Moroccan bases from which, newspapers reported, "potential targets in European Russia and the Black Sea oil region are brought
into range." Preparations were advanced for the building of air
bases in Franco Spain. The United States-Pakistan military alliance and the related Turkey-Pakistan Pact, both bitterly opposed
by India and other Asian countries, were announced, as links in a
chain of Middle Eastern bases against the Soviet Union. Additional
U.S. Air Force personnel were sent to IndoChina, and plans reported to spend another $ i ,2oo,ooo,ooo of the American tax-payer's
money to keep the war in Indochina going, instead of ending it.
Since the conference, the American-Japanese military assistance
pact has been signed, carrying further the plans for the rearming of
Japan as a new base for aggression in the Far East.
Mr. Dulles, on his return from Berlin, was met with a barrage
of criticism from the China Lobby camp for having agreed to a
conference with People's China. After being grilled by members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State
objected bitterly that he should not be subjected to such qiticism,
since "we won every point from the Russians in Berlin."
As to winning every point from the Russians, it is interesting to
note that the only question on which agreement was reached, the
Soviet proposal for a conference including the Chinese People's
Republic, was one which Secretary Dulles had fought desperately
to exclude altogether. Secretary Dulles was compelled to yield on
this point under pressure from M. Bidault who knew that his government's only hope for survival lay in making some gesture toward
ending the hated war in Indochina.
We cannot agree with Mr. Dulles' conclusion that he had
achieved his main purpose and that Berlin "cleared the way" for
pushing ahead with E X .
We believe ratification of EDC will be more, not less difficult,
as a result of the peaceful alternative offered by the USSR.
Opposition to EM: among the French people and in parliament
has intensified as a result of the conference, and is strong in all
political parties from right to left.
In England both the Executive and the Parliamentary groups
of the Labor Party are split sharply on the issue of EDC, while rank
and file opposition has grown steadily in vigor.

Rime Minister Churchill, in a speech in the House of Commons
Fcbruay 25, while supporting EDC, indicated that the Berlin Conference had made "discussion of all these questions less delicate
and dangerous than it was before." He welcomed the Geneva meeting with People's China, and declared that he still favored a top
level meeting of heads of governments.
Sir Winston made a strong plea for more trade with the USSR
and the People's Democracies:

"The more the two great divisions in the world mingle in
the healthy and fruitful activities of commerce, the greater the
counterpoise! to the purely military calculations."
The question of East-West trade has become of paramount importance in both France and England. This was emphasized during
the conference when the announcement was made of the Moscow
offer of over a billion dollars worth of contracts to a visiting delegation of British businessmen. Demands for the lifting of U.S.embar.
goes which are cutting Britain off from lucrative orders from China,
the USSR and the People's Democracies are being made by influential business and official circles in England, who are feeling the
pressure of the competition of the American-fostered industry of
Germany and Japan.
In Italy, too, opposition to EDC is growing, both popular and
parliamentary.
In Western Germany, millions of trade unionists and peace
supporters have joined the people of Eastern Germany in opposing
EDC and calling for peaceful unification. On February 25 Chancellor Adenauer rushed through the Bundestag a constitutional amendment permitting rearmament and conscription to speed the process
of ratification of E X . But the measure was vigorously opposed
by the large German Social Democratic Party.
It is necessary that the utmost vigilance be exerted to insure
that the promising beginnings of a new course in foreign relations
opened up by the Berlin Conference be followed through. Already
there are strong efforts to destroy its positive results, using it as a
pretext for new war preparations.
A favorite remark of the antiSoviet commentators since the
conference has been that it proved that "after all, nothing has
changed since the death of Stalin," meaning that those people who
have taken seriously the Soviet peace moves during the past year
are now demonstrated to have been mistaken.
The basic peace policy of the Soviet Union has indeed not
changed since the death of Stalin. The struggle for negotiations.
for peaceful co-existence has been carried on since the birth of the

Soviet Union, first by Lenin and then by Stalin. This struggle
reached a higher stage than ever during the past year because the
dangers of new war have intensified, and because the growing
de~tructivenessof atomic and hydrogen weapons has made it more
vital than ever to avoid war.
The position of the Soviet Union at the Berlin Conference confirms the statement that has been made so frequently by Soviet
Premier Malenkov that there are no international problems that
cannot be solved if the will to solve them is present. In a speech on
March I n , Malenkov called again for peaceful economic competition
between the USSR and the capitalist countries, instead of cold war,
warning against "a new world war that, with modern weapons,
would mean the destruction of civilization."
The American people are fundamentally wholesome and sensible, and they certainly do not want war. They can be counted on
to act correctly if they know the truth. But the withering barrage
of propaganda poured out in the post-war years about the myth
of Soviet aggression has poisoned the minds of many.
What Americans must understand is that the myth of threatened
Soviet aggression is not accepted by the masses of the people anywhere else in the world. American military leaders and official
spokesmen have themselves had to acknowledge there is no danger
of attack from the Soviet Union.
In order to keep alive the hysteria and fear on which the arms
and atomic program and the ever-increasing chain of worldwide
military bases is sold to the people, the hoax was devised of an
"international Communist conspiracy," supposedly directed by the
Soviet Union to carry out its purposes by "indirect" aggression.
By a monstrous perversion, the socialist ideals which have animated the finest and most humane people all over the world for
more than a century, long before there was a Soviet Union, and
under which a third of the world's people are living today, have
been equated with everything that is evil and vicious, and those
who hold such ideas declared to be agents or dupes of the Soviet
Union. This alleged conspiracy is extended to include all people's
liberation movements, movements for land reform, for higher living
standards, for racial equality, decent education and housing and
working conditions and other needs of common concern to working
people everywhere.
At the Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Secretary Dullcs'
main effort was concentrated on pushing through a resolution &signed to bind all the Latin American countries to take action
together against the "Intervention of International Communism
in the American Republics." Mr. Dulles defined " i n t e r n a t i d
communism" as that "far flung clandestine politid organization

which ia operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of t+c
Soviet Union." Thus he sought to pave the way for United States
intenention in the republic of Guatemala on the ground that democratic reforms there introduced have been the result of this "conspiracy"; or in any future effort of any of the people of Latin
America to replace a military dictatorship by a democratic regime
which would then be cited as a case of "indirect Soviet aggression."
The resolution, passed under pressure, has caused deep resentment
among the peoples of Latin America, whose main interest is in
constructive economic aid from the United States, and the end of
preparation for the next
colonialism. I t was hardly constr~ct~ive
round of negotiations with the Soviet Union.
While anti-communism in our foreign relations has been turned
against all people's liberation movements, here at home we have
seen it boomerang against those who set it in motion.
It is not coknmunism, not the socialist countries that are threatening the h e r i c a n way of life, but anti-communism, with its book
burning, thought control, racism, police state and fascist methods.
The last war, unleashed by the fascist states under the banner of
anti-communism and turned against all the democracies, showed
where anti-communism leads. It is time for the American people to understand this, to learn that the socialist world is here to
stay, that it offers no threat, and that our future security requires
a policy of peaceful co-existence under which the people of all
nations may develop the way of life they choose.
I t is necessary for us to understand the real facts about life in
the Soviet Union and China and the People's Democracies, because
these facts show that their programs for improving the living standards, the material and cultural well-being of their people, depend
on peace for their fulfillment.
The proceedings of the Berlin conference and the Soviet proposals there made, afEord an opportunity to study Soviet foreign
policy in action, and to judge for ourselves where areas of agreement may be found.
The American people have not had access to adequate accounts
of the proposals and discussions at Berlin. Press reports on the
Soviet proposals were limited and biased. Correspondents in Berlin
did not attend the sessions, but had to be content with copies of
the main speeches and briefings from each delegation. Of US.
briefings, M. S. Handler reported in the New York Times for January 96 : "Correspondents complained that the American officials
had employed psychological warfare tactics rather than having provided objective analysis and appraisal of Mr. Molotov's statement."
Yet the proceedings of the conference, the proposals and discussions have a vital importance for all Americans. They affect the

security and well-being of our country, the futur; of our children,
the peace of the world.
That is why New World Review is attempting to help fill the
gap with this pamphlet.
I t is important that Americans know what proposals were made
by the USSR and the flexibility shown by Mr. Molotov in the discussions, so that we may understand that they offer' a basis for continuing negotiations on a peaceful settlement for Europe, for the
Far East, on questions of disarmament and of East-West trade.
The restoration of peace in IndoChina would end eight years
of agony and useless bloodshed forced upon a people fighting for
their independence, the needless losses to France, the dangers of
direct American involvement.
Reduction of armaments, the banning of atomic and hydrogen
weapons, will lift a great weight of fear and dangm from the people
of America and the world, and make it possible to turn our e W s
and our resources to the building of hospitals, roads, schools, homes,
flood control, soil reclamation, hydroelectric and other public works
for the people's welfare.
The opening of East-West trade is the best way to avoid the
oncoming depression. The vast markets of the Soviet Union, People's China and the Eastern European Democracies offer millions
of jobs to solve the swiftly growing unemployment problem.
The opening of East-West social, sport and cultural relations
is the best way of enriching the life of the people of all countries
and establishing the bonds of human brotherhood.
We believe that these are the things the American people want
and that it is possible to achieve them. I t was the people's longing
for an end of the bloodshed that brought about the armistice in
Korea; their weariness with war preparations that brought about
the negotiations in Berlin.
It was the people's indignation that started the movement to
puncture the paver of McCarthy. That indignation must now be
directed against the whole war policy that nurtured him, and
which under the false banner of "anti-co~munism" has been
undermining the very foundations of American democracy.
The ending of the cold war is the best way to end the McCarthyism and McCarranism that are its products, and all the aspects of
the growing fascist menace that is destroying our American way of
life under the monstrous pretense of preserving it.
Now let us make sure that the promises of Berlin and Geneva
are fulfilled. This means that the people must take a hand in
steering our foreign policy firmly on the course of continuing negotiations so that our country shall regain its falling prestige and
once again play an honorable and peaceful role in the world.
I

The Four Powers Meet
THE HOPES of the world were centered on the Four-Power
negotiations as the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, with their delegations, converged on Berlin f o r the opening session of January nij, ,their first
meeting since 1949.
The pattern of prior consultations among the three Western
Powers was continued on the eve of the conference, and during the
conference itself. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conferred
with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and French Foreign
Minister George Bidault before meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov. While it was reported that the three had
agreed in advance "to resist any attempts to turn it into a Big 5
Conference with China present" (New York Herald Tribune, January n4), there was in fact a fifth partner in the deliberations. M. S.
Handler reported in the New York Times, January 25:

"Dr. Blankenhorn, one of Dr. Adenauer's most trusted
advisas on foreign affairs, and the eleven officers of the special
West German mlssion in Berlin, hold a most important assignment: to make certain that there is no deviation at the conference from the agreed program for the reunification of Germany
devised by Chancellor Adenauer and accepted publicly by the
United States and Britain."
Dr. Blankenhorn, incidentally, is a former Nazi Party member
with a long record in Hitler's foreign service, as indeed, have the
majority of those who hold executive posts in Adenauer's foreign
ministry.
In accordance with reported plans for M. Bidault to take the
initiative and for Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden to play "supporting
roles," it fell to the French Foreign Minister to open the conference.
And thus it was that the spokesman of France, where there is the
greatest resistance in Europe to the rearming of Germany, was given
the role of insisting on German rearmament and the European
Defense Community as a prior condition to any agreement. H e
declared, "For the progress of our work here it is essential that it
shall be understood from the beginning that our defense effort
cannot be the object of negotiation." "Defense effort" is the

euphemism generally employed by the West to describe the revival
of the Wehrmacht under EDC.
M. Bidault, of course, was not speaking for the people of France,
for the French parliament, nor indeed for any French Government which could hope to stay in power if it supported EDC.
In fact, he was not even speaking for the French delegation.
Michael Hofhnan reported in the New Ymk Times, January 28:
"According to one diplomatic source in an excellent position
to know, a art from M. Bidault, there is only one man in the
French de egation who fully supports the idea of bringing
Germany into the European Community. He is M. Francob
Poncet. M. Parodi, M. Bidault's top assistant, is firmly and outspokenly opposed to the defense community."

P

Mr. Eden started out by saying that the failure of h o p to
carry out the partnership of the war years had been the main reason
for bringing into existence the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the plans for EDC. He insisted that the agreements made
were purely defensive, that Her Majesty's Government was loyal
both to the United Nations and its treaty with the Soviet Union,
and would never be party to any aggression or threaten the security of the Soviet Union. He said that an all-German Government
set up on the basis of free elections must be the first step and that
"the all-German Government should be free to assume any international rights and obligations of either regime," thus emphasizing the agreed-upon Western attitude that a united Germany must
be associated militarily with the West.
Mr. Molotov in his opening remarks, emphasized that the question of Germany could not be examined apart from the general
question of security in Europe.
He noted that Germany had borne the main responsibility for
unleashing two world wan, and the immeasurable sacrifices suffered by the people of Europe in World War 11. Therefore the
chief task before the conference was to settle the German question
"in a way that would preclude the possibility of new attempts by
German militarism to precipitate a Third World War.."
During and after World War I1 the governments of the four
powers present had held common views on this question, anbodied in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, supported by France
and all the other united nations. Molotov quoted the Yalta decision:
"It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism
and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be
able to destroy the peace of the world."
II

Thus, the basic question being whether a unified Germany will
become a peaceful, democratic state or a militaristic, aggressive one,
he said it is impermissible that Germany should be drawn into a
grouping such as the European Defense Community, a military bloc
of one group of European countries directed against another European group. He showed from historical examples that it is a mere
illusion to think that a revived German militarism could be
kept within the limits of the original plans for the establishment
of a European army.
Mr. Molotov declared that the whole question of security in
Ewope was abound up with the cardinal task of our times-the relaxation of tension in international relations. This required the
co'mbined efforts of all the Great Powers, and a Five-Power Conference with the participation of the Chinese People's Republic
had long been a pressing matter.
The UN Charter had recognized this in requiring unanimity
of the Five Great Powers in important decisions of the Security
Council for the maintenance of peace. This requirement could not
be complied with while the lawful representatives of the Chinese
people are outside the United Nations.
The questions to be considered by such a Five-Power Conference, Molotov felt, should include disarmament, the legitimate
rights of China in the United Nations which in turn would help
in the solution of other problems, as well as its recognition by
other powers, a peace settlement for Korea, and the establishment
of normal conditions for international trade, all of which would
help in easing international tensions.
He declared that today it is the armaments race which above all
creates an unbearable burden for the peoples and cannot but aggravate international relations, since increased armaments on one
side must inevitably lead to corresponding action on the other.
This also pertained to the question of military bases which, when
established far from a country's frontiers, could have nothing to do
with defense. He noted:
"There are uite a number of statements by military and
non-military lea ers of the United States who declare outright
that the establishment of American military bases on foreign
territory is directed against the Soviet Union, against the Peo
ple's Republic of China, against the People's Democracies."

8

He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken toward a substantial reduction of armaments, especially of the Great Powers, and
that the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction be renounced, as a step toward complete prohibition of
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mch weapons, and the establishment of international d n m l to in-

a m against violations.
The Soviet Foreign Minister declared that one of the major
difficulties in convoking the political conference on Korea was the
absence of normal relations between some of the Great Powers, due
to refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China, although
" 'non-recognition' of facts, and moreover 'nun-recognition' o
f major historical events, has never yielded positive results."
Mr. Molotov pointed out that 25 countries have established
or are in process of establishing diplomatic relations with People's
China, that India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma have long had
such relations, and that Premier Nehru of India had stated recently:

!

-

"The United Nations weakens its position by refusing to
admit Communist China. The emergence of the new China is
a tremendous factor in the international situation. Not to recognize China means to shut one's eyes to reality."
Mr. Molotov noted that many European countries, including Atlantic bloc states, had also recognized the necessity of establishing
diplomatic relations with the New China, and that only on the
territory of North and South America not a single state had done so.
Making a strong plea for improvement of trade relations, Mr.
Molotov showed that the restrictions imposed by the United States
on trade with the USSR, China and the People's Democracies had
not achieved their purpose of checking economic progress in these
countries, but on the contrary had promoted it.
Mr. Molotov declared that the Austrian question, too, must
be considered, in the interests of strengthening peace in Europe
and restoring Austria's national independence, bearing in mind
that the settlement must be on a basis which would prevent Austria
from ever again becoming the tool of aggressive forces.
The Soviet Foreign Minister then proposed the following three
points for the conference agenda:
Measures for lessening the tension in international relations
and convocation of a conference of the Foreign Ministers
of France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China.
''2. The German question and the tasks of ensuring European
security.
"3. The Austrian State Treaty."

"1.

This agenda was subsequently unanimously accepted by all
four powers. The press played up as a big concession by the Western Powers that they had accepted the agenda as proposed by

'3
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Molotov. It is difficult, however, to see how they could have done
othemise, since Mr. Molotov had included exactly the points
that both sides had agreed to discuss in the process of the long
exchange of notes preceding the conference.
Seaetary of State John Foster Dulles spoke after the other
three. (He had, in fact, secured acceptance of the French alphabet to determine the order of seating, so that despite the prominence given to M. Bidault at the opening, it always fell to Mr.
Dulles to answer Mr. Molotov's major statements, and the fiction
of French initiative did not last very long.)
Mr. Dulles started out by saying that the opening address by
Mr. Molotov "was a profound disappointment," that it contained
"nothing new," that he was saddened that Mr. Molotov had seized
upon this occasion "to repeat the old false charges and recrimi-

1
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nations."
h e was, of course, referring to ~ r ~olotov's
.
comments on the
real p u r p o ~ sof NATO and EDC, on the growing number of U.S.
military bases throughout the world. In view of the fact that the
Soviet Union had made crystal clear in the pre-conference exchanges that the main obstacle to a Geman settlement was the
EDC plan for rearming Germany, Mr. Molotov could hardly have
avoided going at once into this matter, which had to be at the
heart of any realistic discussions.
Mr. Dulles spent considerable time in buttering up M. Bidault
for taking a magnanimous attitude toward Germany despite all
that Fra-ncehad suffered at the hands of Nazism. He even went so
T.
far as to compare Bidault with Lincoln for his spirit of 4'ma1icr
toward none and charity toward all."
He contrasted the attitude of Mr. Molotov as "evoking the
spirit of vengeance and hatred marking the Treaty of Versailles."
Secretary Dulles said there was no known substitute for EDC,
insisting that its sole purpose is to prevent German militarism and
. a modest defense force in which indithat it envisages only
vidual Germans have a minority part and the whole of which is
dedicated to defensive purposes."
On the question of a Five-Power Conference, Mr. Dulles
launched into a most violent attack on the Chinese People's Republic as a "convicted aggressor." He declared that the United
States does not deny its existence or refuse to deal with it as occasion requires, but "It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a
fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's lbreast *and call it
good.
He then declared unequivocally that the United States
"will not agree to join in a Five-Power Conference with the Chinese Communist aggressors for the purpose of dealing generally
with the peace of the world."

". .

. . ."
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I t was noted, however, that this categorical refusal was confined to general questions of peace, and that the door was not
closed to the possibility of a conference on specific questions.
Regarding the role allocated by Mr. Dulles to France, the New
York Times of January 28 reported, contrasting the position at
the conference of the United States, Britain and France, at Bermuda: "Frenchmen were surprised and pleased, yet a trifle dubious, upon learning today that France apparently had been pre
moted from a kind of junior partnership to the position of senior
spokesman for the three Western Powers." Among the French,
the dispatch continued,

". . . some thought Mr. Dulles had rather overdone his tribute

to France since in December he warned her against dropping
European integration, but yesterday he treated her as though
she were burning with ardor for both military and political
integration. It looked to some as if Mr. Dzllles had already
forgotten M. Bidault's long and vehement speech in Bermuda
explaining how hard it would be to sell the European army
."
treaty to the French Parliament.

..

Commenting on the speech of Mr. Dulles, Mr. Molotov said
it appeared that Mr. Dulles had counterpoised the viewpoint
of the Soviet delegation to that of the French and British, and
he did not think this was a correct approach to the conference.
He said of course there was no use trying to pretend that there
were no disputes between the delegates, but that the important
thing was not only to determine what questions were in dispute, but
to single out those questions on which agreements might be reached.
Referring to a remark .by Mr. Eden to the effect that the British
delegation could see no compromise in connection with certain
points, Mr. Molotov continued:
that

"This is all very well. But does it mean that we have assembled with the idea that neither British nor French nor
American nor Soviet representatives would make any compre
mise?
"I believe that we have assembled not in order to make
categorical statements, but in order to hear one another and to
find ways to agreement on questions on which we can agree
today; as for questions on which agreement cannot be reached
today and whch should be considered inadequatelyF P T ~
for decision, we should, of course, continue their lscussion
tomorrow or at a moment we shall find appropriate."
Mr. Molotov showed that there was no justification f a r Mr.
Dulles'. charge that the Soviet Union was evoking the spirit of

V d l c s . The Soviet Union, he said, was not a signatory to that
treaty, as were the three Western Powers, and was in no way
responsible for it. The Soviet Union was, however, a signatory
to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which rejected any vindictive policy toward the
people, and theiefore had a joint
responsibility in carrying out their provisions, which offered a
basis for a democratic and peaceable Germany. He made very
clear that those aspects of the Potsdam Agreement which were of
a provisional character, referring to the immediate post-war situation, had lost their validity, but that its main principles, safeguarding the security of Europe and of Germany itself, remained
valid. He asked, in effect, whether the signatures of the powers
that signed the treaty were to be cheapened, or the agreement adhered to. The Western Powers gave their answer in the complete rejection of Potsdam.

ema an

On

a Five-Power Conference

DISCUSSION
OF AGENDAITEM 1: Measures for lessening the tension in international relations and convocation of o conference of the Foreign Ministers of
France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China.
OPENING the discussion of the first point on the agenda, Mr.
Molotov declared that it requires no proof that China with its
500,000,000 people must be treated as a great power, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China as a great historic
event.
Regarding Secretary Dulles' charges against People's China
which he had based on the UN resolution declaring China an
aggressor, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that resolution had done
no honor to the United Nations and had in fact undermined its
authority. He declared:

". .

. We must not forget that the Chinese volunteers intervened in Korean events at a time when the troops of other
states had reached the border of China, the Yalu River, when
a threat was created to the boundaries of the People's Republic
of China. That cannot be said of the United States of America.
Those military developments took place at a distance of 7,000
to 8,000 kilometers from the borders of the United States, but

I

only a few kilometers from the borders of the People's Republic of China, and it is clear that the friendly states-the
People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Deme
cratic Republic, found a common language. It follows that it
is entirely out of place to speak here of aggression, to say nothing
of the fact that it is completely at variance with the real state
of affairs."
Mr. Molotov noted further that the role of People's China
in bringing about the armistice in Korea had to be borne in mind
in considering the importance of China in the over-all question of
strengthening peace.
Replying to an objection raised .by Mr. Dulles that five powers
should not have the right to give orders to other states, Mr. Molotov said he was in agreement with this and nothing of the sort
was intended. He said the Four Powers were meeting in Berlin
not to give orders to other states, but to assist in finding solutions
to international questions that would be helpful to their own pee
ples and peoples of other states, and that a Five-Power meeting was
quite as legitimate for this purpose as a Four-Power meeting.
Mr. Molotov then proposed that there be a conference in the
spring of 1954, including the four Foreign Ministers meeting in
Berlin and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China,
to consider, in conformity with United Nations principles, such
questions as armaments reduction, political problems and the improvement of relations between countries, the increase of international trade, especially East-West trade, and any other questions
pertaining to lessening the tension in international relations.
Mr. Dulles was extremely sarcastic in his reply. He paid tribute
to Mr. Molotov's diplomatic skill (in fact he was reported in the
press as having the opinion that Mr. Molotov was the most slcillful
diplomat of the last hundred years) in pulling out solutions to all
problems like rabbits out of a hat, and in seeming to suggest that
everything could be solved "if we were to invite Mr. Chou En-lai
to sit down with us."
Renewing his previous sharp attacks on the Chinese People's
Republic, in anything but that fine Lincolnesque spirit he had
found so commendable in M. Bidault's attitude toward Germany,
the U.S. Secretary of State declared:
"Who is this Mr. Chou En-lai? We is the leader of a regime
which gained de facto power on the China mainland throu h
bloody war, which has liquidated millions of Chinese as 8 e
only means of maintaining its power, which so diverts the economic resources of its impoverished people to military efforts
that they starve lby the millions .

. ."

He said, referring to Molotov's proposals, that "our moral eense
forbids the relationship he proposes."+
Strangely, Mr. Dulles' moral sense does not forbid relationship
with the discredited dictator Chiang Kai-shek, although it is in
fact his repudiated regime that this description fits, and not the
regime of which Chou En-lai is Premier and Foreign Minister,
which has the support of the 500,000,000 Chinese people.
Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault seemingly consented to Mr.
Dulles' rejection of a Five-Power Conference. When Mr. Eden,
whose rejiction lacked the determination of Mr. Dulles', pmposed
that the discussion be deferred, and it was later decided to >oitinue
it in restricted sessions, Mr. Molotov agreed.
M o r e leaving the first item on the agenda, Mr. Molotov reminded the Foreign Ministers that this point also called for a consideration of "measures for reducing tensions in international 1
relations."
Pointing to the arms race as one of the greatest causes of world
tensions, he proposed that a world conference on general reduction
of armaments be convened in 1954, and offered a resolution providing that the Four Powers-

e
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". . .guided by a desire to strengthen peace and reduce ten-

sion in international relations, and considering it necessary to
take measures to relieve the heavy burden of military expenditures borne by the peo le in connection with the armaments
race, have agreed that t e Soviet Union, the United States, the
United Kingdom and France would take measures within the
framework of the United Nations to convene in 1954 a world
conference on general reduction of armaments with the participation of both the members of the United Nations and nonmember states. Full agreement has been reached that the
of measures for the general reduction of armaments ~ h o u l ~
linked up with a simultaneous solution of the problem of atomic
weapons."

K

Still carrying the ball for the three Western Powers, M. Bidault
reiected the idea of a disarmament conference this year, and intrcl
diced a counter-resolution asking that the Soviet proposal be referred to the UN Disarmament Commission for study, adding the
provision that such a conference should not be held until all hostilities, such as in Indo-China, be first ended and aggression outlawed.
What happened during the subsequent discussions on Item One
of the agenda is not known, since they were held in secret. However,
it became increasingly clear as the conference went on that both
M. Bidault and Mr. Eden were pressing for a conference with P e e
See Appendix, page 64, for pertinent rtatcment 'by a Chinese Quaker.
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ple's China, and that the insistent demands of the French people
for a move to end the war in Indo-China would make the position
of M. Bidault untenable if he could not bring something out of the
conference pointing in that direction.
It was also clear that despite Mr. Dulles' original flat rejection
of the idea of a conference including People's China this spring, he
yielded on this point in order to prevent any possibility that France
might open direct negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh, leaving the
United States out of the picture.
The final agreement to hold this conference, as set forth in the
Communique on page 53, thus became the main accomplishment
at Berlin.
It was not the kind of conference Mr. Molotov and many othcrs
had hoped for. Instead of covering the over-all world issues in
which People's China must inevitably play a part, the conference
was limited to the questions of Korea and Indo-China. The Western
Powers, under Mr. Dulles' insistence, refused to agree that the
People's Republic of China be one of the inviting powers. Mr.
Molotov's concessions on these points made possible the convocation
of the conference.
At Mr. Dulles' insistence, the sentence was added that neither
the invitation nor the holding of the conference "shall be deemed
to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already
been accorded" in order to avoid any conclusion that the inclusion
of the Chinese People's Republic was a step toward recognition on
the part of the United States. Of course this equally applies to the
Syngman Rhee Government, which the Soviet Union does not recognize.
What was really accomplished was that through this conference
the long-delayed political conference on Korea, stalled since the
breaking off of the Panmunjom negotiations by the United States,
was finally scheduled.
Nothing was said as to the condition reportedly raised frequently
by the Western Powers in the course of the discussions that "Chinese aid" to Ho Chi-Minh must cease before a conference with
People's China could be held. Indeed, this would have been an
awkward point to insist upon, in view of the massive scale of United
States military assistance to the French and the recent dispatch of
additional U.S. Air Force technicians to I n d d h i n a .
Despite all Mr. Dulles' attempts to put a good face on the
Geneva conference by saying that he "got loo per a n t what he
wanted," although he had made quite dear at the beginning that
he wanted no such conference at all, this conference is in fact much
nearer to the round table conference which most of the United
Nations members had desired than the conference of two hostile

rlda which the United States had been trying to achieve. It does
not have the advantage of including other neutral interested coum
tries of the Far East such as India, but neither does it, despite Mr.
Dulles' insistence to the contrary, designate the Soviet Union, an
inviting power, as a belligerent
The final agreement on the disarmament question, simply providing for an exchange of views as provided for in the United
Nations Resolution of November 38, 1953 (which had referred the
matter to the Disarmament Commission), was a rather feeble one,
and far from the plan for world disarmament conference in 1954
desired by the Soviet Union. But any proposal to exchange views
can be considered an advance, and opens a new opportunity for
steps to end the H-Bomb nightmare.

O n Germany
And European Security
DISCUSSION
OF AGENDAI ~ P:MThe German Question and the task of muring European security.

AN ELABORATE plan was worked out ,by Mr. Dulles, Mr.
Eden and M. Bidault, to sidetrack further discussion of Mr. Molotov's disarmament proposal and get on immediately to the question
of Germany.
Mr. Dulles, in the course of the discussions of the Molotov pro
posal, commented sourly:
"So far all this conference has done-now in its fifth day of
deliberations-is to discuss futilely how to create new conferences, and the new conferences do nothing better than to create
more new conferences, that the whole conference method will
become an object of ridicule, and we with it."

How little Mr. Dulles seems to understand or care about the
desires of the people of the world who are asking at the moment
for nothing better than that the big powers keep on talking and
keep on arranging new conferences, knowing that each day that
they talk together, each new conference that is arranged, makes war
less likely.

1 the maneuvers to circumvent Mr. Molotov w a r quite unncc- 14
He himself turned immediately to the question of Germany
sion, declaring that his governmknt had no
conference and would seek in every way to
eign Minister began with a forceful plea that
resentatives of the German Democratic Republic and of the
m a n Federal Republic be invited to take part in the discussions
on the German problem. He reported that on January 37 he had
turned over to the conference a communication received from the
German Democratic Republic suggesting the participation of their
representatives. Mr. Molotov said that while no such request had
been received from the German Federal Republic, he hardly thought
they would not wish also to be represented. For his part, he said
he was not familiar with the position of the West German Government on many issues, and would like to hear their viewpoint.
The Soviet Government had always held that there could be no
wttlement of the German question in a peaceful and democratic
manner without participation by the Germans themselves.
Mr. Dulles brushed off the proposal, indicating that there was
rro proper governmental authority in Eastern Germany, and no
representatives "freely and legally chosen" could appear on her
behalf. Since Britain and France went along with the United States
o possibility of gaining agreement, Mr. Molgness to proceed with the discussion, although
d to this point as essential to any peaceful

The Eden Proposal
i:

Anthony Eden thereupon proposed a five-stage plan for German
unification. While he presented it as his own, Clifton Daniels
reported in the New York Times, January go, that the plan had
been drafted by experts of the United States, Great Britain and
France and was "heartily approved by the West German GovernThe five stages outlined by the British Foreign Minister were,
throughout Germany. 11. The convening of a
sulting from these elections. 111. The drafting
the preparation of peace treaty negotiations
IV. The adoption of the constitution and the formation of an allresponsible for the negotiation of the peace
treaty. V. The signature and entry into .force of the peace treaty.
How simple, direct and reasonable. No encumlbering provisions

f

a b u t t h a agreed-upon Potsdam safeguards against the Nazis and
monopolists coming back to power and those troublesome assurances that Germany "will never again be able to destroy the peace
of the world." No dangerous ideas about the German people being
able to work things out for themselves. No complicated considerations as to how to remnde the monopoly-based regime in the West
with the people's regime of the East. No hampering restrictions
about the time for ending Allied occupation, the withdrawal of
foreign forces or what would happen to United States military bases
in Western Germany. Too simple perhaps? Let us see how Mr.
Eden elaborated on his proposals.
Mr. Eden enunciated the noble principles behind his plan:
"Free elections are the only way of obtaining a true expression of
the people's will."
(Mr. Eden's concern for free elections might have carried more
weight had it not been for certain recent events in Guiana where
the British Government, not liking the direction the people's will
was taking, sent troops and war ships to throw out a government
which had received an overwhelming majority in free elections, and
suspended the democratically a d q t e d constitution under which
the will of the people was being carried out.)
And how would the German people be enabled "freely to choose
their own representatives" while the foreign occupation forces still
remained? Mr. Eden declared that safeguards and supervision
would obviously be necessary. He said an adequate election law
must first be drawn up by the Four Powers, who could "draw on"
both the Bundestag in the West and the Assembly in the East for
proposals from drafts already made. The electoral law would
contain guarantees of complete freedom of association, meetings,
press, radio, television, the right of any party to present candidates,
and so on.
Then there must be supervision by a commission on which each
of the Four Powers should be represented. Neutrals might be added
-that could be discussed. All the decisions of this commission
would be on a majority basis (insuring, though Mr. Eden did not
mention this, that the decisions would always be in favor of the
Western Powers, outnumbering the Soviet representstives three to
one, and hence in favor of the Bonn regime.)
This commission would continue its supervisory functions during the elections themselves. While the elected assembly was preparing the constitution, a provisional all-German authority might
be set up which could help in drawing up the constitution, prepare
the nucleus of a future all-German administrative machine and
open negotiations on a peace treaty which could be concluded when
the new government formed under the constitution came into

-
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king. In the meantime, the German Federal Republic and the
German Administration in the Soviet Zone (the Western powem
usually followed Mr. Dulles in using this term rather than the am
rect name of German Democratic Republic M. Bidault and Mr.
Eden sometimes made this concession, but Mr. Dulles never did)
would continue in being, transferring their powers to the new ~ O V ernment when established.
And now the rub. There must not be a complete break in German international relationships. This means a united Germany is
to join the EDC, and far from taking into account the main prob
lem of preventing the revival of German militarism, specifically
provides for such revival. Mr. Eden declared:
"The all-German government, once established, must be free
to assume such of the international rights and obligations of the
Federal Republic, and of the Soviet Zone in Germany, as it considers necessary. I t must also be free to conclude other international agreements, if it so desires, provided of course that they
are consistent with the United Nations Charter. On the other
hand, our four governments have special rights and responsibilities in Germany until a peace treaty comes into force."
Since the peace treaty was relegated to the final stage of Mr.
Eden's plan, this meant that the occupation would continue indefinitely. Elections carried on under the control of foreign governments and their armed forces would be, of course, the opposite of
free elections.
Furthermore, a strange feature of this plan, presented as the
only way "of obtaining a true expression of the people's will," was
that it took no account whatsoever of the will of the 18,000,ooo people in Eastern Germany.
The proposals of the German Democratic Republic were presented to the Foreign Ministers on January go by Mr. Molotov,
but no one but Mr. Molotov, who later embodied them in his own
plan, paid any attention to them.
Mr. Dulles and M. Bidault enthusiastically supported the Eden
plan.

Molotov's Proposal for a Peace Treaty
Mr. Molotov took quite a different approach to the German
question, from that of Mr. Eden who, he remarked, had "spoken
as a scholastic constitutionalist of the strict German type." He
said Mr. Eden's plan for elections required serious consideration,
b u t there were fundamental issues that came first.
TheSoviet Foreign Minister declared that the main aim before

the conference was to insure the peace of Europe and to prevent
the resurgence of German militarism. Thus the question of the
peace treaty with Germany had to take precedence over purely
mechanical election procedures, and he would address himself first
to that.
Recalling the temble sacrifices of his own and other peoples in
the last world war, the destruction of tens of thousands of cities and
villages, the loss of millions of human lives, Molotov urged that
the attention of the Foreign Ministers be centered on making sure
that these things should never be repeated.
Molotov asserted that the Soviet Union's position was that the
Four Powers present should be guided by their joint wartime
a&rectnents:
"These agreements stipulated that the Soviet Union, the
United States and Great Britain will act jointly to help the
German people reestablish their state on democratic and peaceful lines. France, too, acceded to these decisions in the past,
although today Mr. Bidault time and again disassociates himself from these agreed decisions. I think, however, that France
needs these agreements no less than, say, the Soviet Union.
"We admit that not a few points of the Potsdam Agreements
are already out of date. Nevertheless, the main purpose of
these agreements fully remains in force. The purpose of these
agreements is that in settling the German problem, France, the
USSR, Britain and the United States of Amer.ica act jointly and
that our countries find a common language with the German
people, namely with their democratic forces, in order to prevent
a new war in Europe."

Mr. Molotov said that the ruins of Berlin all around them
brought home what the German people themselves had suffered,
and that the Soviet delegation considered that "the German problem is first of all a matter for the German people themselves."
Because of the circumstances of the World War, the four countries
present had a special role to play until the conclusion of a peace
treaty. If the four countries would act together, and not try to use
even a part of Germany for opposing some European countries
against others, it would be possible to solve the German problem
successfully, and to achieve a unified, democratic and peaceful Germany that would enter the ranks of equal European countries. But,
he declared:
"Plans for the establishment of a so-called 'European Defense
Community' are impelling Germany onto another path . .
three countries-the United States of America, Britain and
France-are trying, together with ofhdal cirdes of present-day

.
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e remarked that it was strange indeed that certain French

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Union could not but take into
unt these measures since they were openly directed against the
USSR and the People's Democracies, and were supplemented by the
85

a m of sabotage and subversion carried on in the Soviet Union, the
People's Democracies and the Soviet zones in Germany and Austria
under U.S. "Mutual Security Act" appropriations.
He pointed out that the Bonn and Paris agreements, designed
to attach Western Germany to the North Atlantic military grouping, are evidently supposed to replace a Peace Treaty. Under t h e e
agreements, he said, Western Germany would for 50 years to come
be in the position of a semi-ompied country, deprived of national
sovereignty and independence in its foreign affairs. And it was now
proposed that this system be extended throughout Germany. He
warned that no German could be expected to follow such a path
voluntarily:

"Indeed, can anyone believe that for an indefinitely long
period the Germans in Western Germany will tolerate a situation wherein they are unable to settle independently either their
internal affairs or questions of their foreign relations with other
countries? How can one picture to oneself a situation that in
some part of Germany, in the given instance Western Germany,
three Western countries-the United States, Britain and France
-could at any moment interfere in its internal life, introduce a
state of emergency whenever they wish, and in general play the
part of unlimited lords and masters? . . . If same official persons
of present-day Germany now agree to this, it is by no means
because, while observing enforced docility today, they are thinking seriously that it is possible to maintain such a state of affairs
for decades to come."
Molotov suggested that the German militarists could hardly be
counted on to stop at the 12 divisions envisaged in the Paris Treaty.
Since there was no possibility that the German Democratic Republic
would follow the same road, the implementation of the Bonn and
Paris agreements would create insurmountable barriers for the
unification of Germany. He declared:

". . .

These projects will benefit only the German revanchists
who are dreamlng of an early revival of German militarism and
the expansion of their war industries."
The Soviet Foreign Minister insisted that there was a way out,
if the four countries would abandon their attempts to oppose each
other, agree not to permit a resurgence of German militarism, and
conclude a peace treaty. Two years ago the Soviet Government had
submitted to the other three governments its draft of such a treaty,
but had never received any comments or counter proposals.
Molotov proposed that preparations for the peace treaty should
be undertaken simultaneously with preparations for the establish-
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ment of an all-German government, as the British Foreign Secretary
himself had proposed back in 1947, with the agreement of the
United States and France. He suggested that the Deputy Foreign
Ministers of the Four Powers prepare a draft treaty within three
months. Representatives of East and West Germany should be
drawn into the preparation of the peace treaty, but its final examination and adoption should be carried on with the participation of
the all-German government, and subject to ratification by an allGerman parliament. The opinions of Allied states who took part
in the war against Germany should also be sought in preparing the
treaty.
Molotov made clear that the only basis on which an alLGmnan
government could be set up was on the basis of free electiau, and
that the expediting of such elections war one of the main duties of
the conference.
Mr. Molotov declared that the very fact of starting preparations
for a peace treaty would facilitate the joint work of the Four Powers, and rapprochement between both parts of Germany as well as
accelerating progress toward the holding of allGerman elections
and the formation of an all-German government.
He then submitted an amended draft of the Soviet proposals
for a peace treaty with Germany, and proposed that a peace conference be convened within six months, or at any rate not later
than October 1954, for considering it, along with any counter proposals the other governments concerned might make, or any new
draft that might be agreed upon.
Following the preamble which stressed the major importance
of the speedy conclusion of the treaty in the interests of peace in
Europe and in the world, the Soviet text outlining the proposed
principles of the treaty is as follows:

Principles for a Peace Treaty with Germany
Participants: The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the
United States, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the
Netherlands and other states whose armed forces took part in
the war with Germany.
Political Clauses: 1. Germany shall be reestablished as an
integral state. This will put an end to the partition of Germany
and make it possible f o r a united Germany to develop as an
independent, democratic and peaceable state.
2. All armed forces of occupying powers shall be withdrawn
from Germany not later than one year from the day the peace
treaty enters into force. Simultaneously all foreign military
bases on Germany's territory shall be eliminated.

3. The German people shall be guaranteed democratic
rights: Every person under German jurisdiction, irrespective of
me, sex, language or religion, shall enjoy human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religion, political opinion, and assembly.
4. Democratic parties and organizations in Germany shall
be guaranteed freedom of activity, with the right freely to
decide their internal affairs, hold congresses and meetings, and
enjoy freedom of the press and publication.
5. The existence of organizations hostile to democracy and
the maintenance of peace shall not be permitted on German
territory.
6. All former personnel of the German Army, including
officers and generals, and all ex-Nazis, with the exception of
those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes,
shall be granted civil and political rights on an equal footing
with all other German citizens, thus enabling them to partici- ,
pate in the building of a peaceable and democratic Germany.
. ,
7. Germany shall pledge herself not to enter into any coali- '
tions or military alliances directed against any country whose
armed forces took part in the war with Germany.
8. No obligations of a political or military nature shall be
,
imposed on Germany as a result of treaties or agreements ccmcluded by the Government of the German Federal Republic
and the German Democratic Republic prior to the signing of a
peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of Germany
as an integral state. [Clause 8 added to original draft]
Territorye:The territory of Germany shall be determined
by boundaries fixed in the decisions of the Potsdam conference! 1
of the Great Powers.
Economic Clauses: I. No restrictions shall be imposed upon
Germany with respect to the development of her peace economy,
which must serve to promote the welfare of the German people.
Nor shall any restrictions be imposed upon Germany in respect
to trade with other countries, navigation and access to world
markets.
s. Germany shall be fully released fmm payment of nztional postwar debts to the United States of America, the United
MI
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While no discussion of the question of Germany's eastern boundaries was
reported to have taken place, this is a vital issue for future peace. Chancellor
Adcnauer has openly announced his intention to regain by force the territories
beyond the Oder-Neisse line, which ,by Allied agreement were recovered by
Poland after the war, wibh the understanding that this would be confiraned in
the peace treaty with Germany.

Kingdom, France and the USSR, excepting indebtedness on
trade obligations. [Clause 2 added to original draft]
Military Ckzwes: 1. Germany shall be permitted to have
such national armed forces (land, air and naval) as shall be required for the country's defense. The size of these armed forces
shall be limited in conformity with tasks of an internal nature,
local defense of frontiers, and air defense. [Second sentence
added to original draft]
2. Germany shall be permitted to produce war material8
and weapons, but only in quantities and of types required for
the armed forces sanctioned by the peace treaty.
Germany and the United Nations: The states which sign
the peace treaty with Germany shall support her application for
admission to the United Nations.

•

In the course of the subsequent discussion, M. Bidault, giving his
full support to the Eden plan, declared that Molotov was mistaken
in thinking that the international obligations assumed by the German Federal Republic would be autamatially extended to all
Germany af ter unification:
"It means on the contrary, giving to the government of a
united Gemany a full liberty of choice.
I t will be up to the
German government itself to decide if it desires to assuwe the
international obligations previously contracted by the Federal
Republic or by the German Democratic Republic"

...

Mr. Eden hastened to give similar assurances:
"We have no intention of demanding that the new German
Government should be bound in advance to accept the EM=
Treaty or any other international obligations. We think that
it will wish to do so and it is our strong conviction that in such
an organization Germany will be safer for herself and a safer
neighbor for all Europe."
Now these were very interesting declarations indeed. The whole
purpose of the European Defense Community was supposedly to
insure that the German Army would become permanently a part
of the Bnation European army and under its control, and would
have no chance to withdraw, and it was on this basis, supposedly
an ironbound safeguard against Germany ever again being in a
position to form an aggressive national army, that the United
States and Britain have been pressuring a reluctant France and
Italy to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty and endorse
the reestablishment of a German Wehmacht.
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Dulles Answers Molotov
Mr. Dulles rejected the Soviet peace treaty proposals.
He declared flatly that under no circumstances would he
deal with the representatives of the German Democratic Republic,
thus underlining the intention of the Western Powers to extend
the Bonn regime through all af Germany. He said that the government in West Germany "draws its authority from the people as
a result of free and vigorously contested elections," while he described the elections in East Germany as having been conducted
by threats of force.
He said this was why he could not accept the position "that the
four of us should accept the so-called German Democratic Republic
as one of the principal organs whereby the German problem is
solved," that the German people would regard as "contaminated
any decisions "fastened upon them through the interposition of the
'German People's Republic.' "
The Secretary of State said that Mr. Molotov had "sought to
divert us from serious discussion" by his charges that the Western
Powers were trying to form a military bloc directed against the
h i e t Union. Referring to American sacrifices in two wars against
Germany he declared:

"In the light of that history, the United States feels that it
has earned the right to shrug off, as foolish chatter, the accusation that it now seeks to recreate the very force that has twice so
cruelly hurt it."

Mr. Dulles, defending the NATO system, insisted that the Western security arrangements were "a mighty safeguard against aggression," since no one nation could act alone, but only through the
combined will of many nations. He declared:

"The greatest danger to world peace lies in the fact that in
some cases a vast military establishment can be made to attack
by the decision of a single nation, sometimes indeed by the decision of a single man. This is a situation which is understandably terrifying."
While Mr. Dulles intended this as a barb at the Soviet Union,
he was, in fact, presenting the main argument against his own position. All Europe knows that any such danger comes not from the
Soviet Union but from the remilitarized Germany advocated by
Mr. Dulles. And the description also comes very close to Mr. Dulles'
own instant, massive, atomic retaliation policy.
Mr. Dulles' fulminations were echoed, though rather more

palely, by Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault. While the three Western
,; $or
Ministers accused Mr. Molotov of failing to discuss their proposals
free elections, although he had assured them he was coming to
-

that question later, not one of them entered into any discussion at
all of the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty. Mr. Molotov
made it quite dear he was ready to discuss any counter-prop&
they might offer.

Molotov Proposes a Referendum
Answering the attacks on his proposals, Mr. Molotov returned
to the question of the European Defense Community as the heart
of the question of freedom of choice for the German people.
He said that in fact no real freedom was insured the German
people either in the preparation of or during elections under Mr.
Eden's project, since under the Bonn Agreement the three Western
Powers are given for decades to come the right to interfere in the
internal afEairs of Western Germany and to proclaim a state of
emergency whenever they wished. No one had as yet answered
this point. Mr. Molotov asked:
"It is sometimes said that obligations assumed under the
Bonn and Paris agreements would be in force only until a peace
treaty is signed, but in that case why is it proposed to conclude
the Bonn and Paris agreements for a term of fifty years? Does
this not signify that no serious importance k attached to the
promise of the Western Powers to expedite the conclusion of a
peace treaty, since in fact it is held that the Germans will have
to wait for decades for a peace treaty?"
Mr. Molotov pointed out that the statements made by Mr. Eden
and M. Bidault that a unified German government would not be
bound by the terms of the Bonn and Paris agreements, were contradictory to the very terms of the Bonn Agreement, Article 7, paragraph n, of which reads:
"The Three Powers (the United States, Britain and France)
and the Federal

added)
Thus, the integration into the European Community is determined in advance of the coming into existence of a new

govern-

men6 A further paragraph binds the Federal Republic not to con-

dude any agreement which would lessen this obligation, except by
common consent of all three Western states, which means that it is
prevented from entering into any plan for unification which does
not provide for Germany's integration within EDC.
He showed that these obligations assumed by Western Germany
wen further bolstered by a Three-Power Declaration issued by the
United States, France and Britain, May 27, 1952, in connection
with the signing of the Paris Agreement, which declares that if any
action threatens the unity of the European Community, these governments would regard this "as a threat to their own security,'' and
would act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
(Article 4 provides that the "parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them is threatened.") In
other words, they threatened reprisal if Germany or any other nation
tried to leave the integrated army, once established.
Refeming to Mr. Dulles' assertion that the government of West
Germany is authoritative, while refusing to recognize the authority
of the East German government, Mr. Molotov proposed verifying
how matters really stand, by a pull of the German people themselves, through a nation-wide referendum.
Since the West German authorities uphold the Bonn and Paris
agreements and are in no hurry as regards a peace treaty, while the
Geman Democratic Republic opposes these agreements and supports the earliest possible conclusion of a peace treaty, the Soviet
Foreign Minister asked:
"Why not propose to hold a popular poll, to hold a referendum throughout Germany in order to ascertain what the
German people stand for: for the Bonn-Paris agreements, or
for a peace treaty?
"Then we would all have a clear answer to the question
as to who really voices the aspirations of the German people
in our days."
Mr. Molotov's referendum plan was ignored by Mr. Dulles and
Mr. Eden. Mr. Bidault rejected it as containing "loaded questions."
The East German People's Chamber endorsed the idea by a
unanimous vote.
The Bonn government attacked the proposal.
The three Western Powers again assured Mr. Molotov that a
reunited Germany would be completely free to reject membership
in the E X . Secretary Dulles sought to end the argument by proposing'an amendment to the Western proposal for German unification, suggesting that the phrase "Germany must be free to as-
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sulne any international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic or of the East German regime" should be changed to read,
"must be free to assume or reject." But no suggestion came from
the West for revision of the Bonn and Paris treaties themselves
to eliminate their binding character.
In a radio broadcast from Berlin, February 7, CBS commentator Howard K. Smith referred to the fact that every time Mr. Molotov repeated that a future German government would be bound
by the EDC agreement, the three Western representatives denied
it. Mr. Smith said that some observers "thought that Molotov was
out of his wits by his insistence," a ~ d
I
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"In fact. his wits never served him better. T h e people of
France are now in grave doubt whether to agree to thoie Geaties
that would allow Germany to rearm. They have been told by
the Western leaders that there, is no danger, for Germany once
rearmed would be bound into the integrated army, unable to
. All that Molotov was doing by
make decisions of its own.
his performance here this week was getting the Western leaders to deny their past assuran
to the French people. He got
the Western three, one by o n r t o stand and to repeat several
times that Germany would not be bound by integration. After
France has agreed to Adenauer forming a West German army,
West Germany might then unite with East Germany and the
resulting stronger unified Germany would no longer be limited
by the integrated European army command.
"In coming weeks, when the European army plan comes up
for debate in France, these statements by Western leaders
provoked from them by Molotov here, are .likely to be heard
again and again to discourage the French Parliament from
agreeing to treaties to allow West Germany to have an army."

..

Soviet Plan for German Elections and Unification
Mr. Molotov then turned to a discussion of the Eden plan and
the counter-proposals of the USSR. He pointed out that the complex problems involved in uniting the two parts of Germany could
not be solved by the merely formal and technical approach of the
Eden plan. The substance of the matter had to come first.
It was necessary, he said, to reckon with the existence in Germany of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, each with its own government and constitution,
separate currency, separate border and internal police. He described some of the differences in the two parts of Germany:
"In conformity with the decision of the Potsdam conference, monopolies and cartels have been fully liquidated in

Eastern Germany, their existence is prohibited by the Constitution, and the large-scale property of Hitlerite war criminals
has been turned over to the people. Democratic land reform
has been carried out with the lands of tbe big Junkers, who
were the bulwark of German militarism, having been turned
over to the land-hungry peasants and settlers.
"In Western Germany, notwithstanding the decision taken
in Potsdam to eliminate the excessive concentration of economic power, cartels and monopolies continue to dominate
the economy. Land reform has not been carried out there to
this day, and war aiminals and militarists play an ever greater
part in the government and the economy."
Molotov declared Mr. Eden's plan did not meet the test that
all plans for unification must be in conformity with the aim of

establishing a peace-loving, democratic Germany. German history
showed that parliamentary procedures alone could not achieve
this, since Hitler's advent to power had been prepared in a parliamentary way. Molotov reviewed the parliamentary elections
of i g l ~ ,and the maneuvers through which von Papen, Hindenberg, Schleicher and others had helped bring Hitler to power.
He recalled that Adenauer springs from the same political roots
as von Papen, both of them having belonged to the right wing
of the "party of the enter" during the Weimar Republic.
He pointed out that it was not parliamentary procedure that
mattered, but the behind-the-scenes support of such magnates of
heavy industry as the Thyssens, Krupps and others, and the millions
of marks and tens of millions of dollars that flowed into the coffers
of Hitler's National Socialist Party from the big bankers and industrial magnates.
He warned of the dangers of present day von Papens and
Schleichers who will pave the way to bring new Hitlers to power.
The five stages of the Eden plan contained no preventive measures
on this point. The millions who had shed their blood fighting
Hitleri te aggression could not rely on spontaneity, because"It may happen, just as during the time of Hitler, that
the worst, that 1s the antidemocratic elements, will take adof the postwar difIiculties of the German people and
find t emselvea at the crest of political life. There will also
appear on the scene industrial magnates and banks that will
again spend many millions of marks and dollars to place in
power such'men as will disdain nothing in doing their bidding.
There are such arrant gamblers of a revenge-seeking type in
Western Germany. Not so long ago British occupation authorities, for example, spoke about the revival of fascist organizations in Western Germany. This is a real menace not

vantar

only to Germany's neighbors but also to tile Geman people
themselves, and primarily to the overwhelming majority of the
population, the working people of Germany."
"Let us begin," urged Molotov, "with the internal prerequisites for the unification of Germany along peaceable and
deinocratic lines. This means, as we all desire, that the elections
in Germany should be £ree and democratic, that they must be
conducted by the German people themselves, and not by foreign
occupation authorities as provided under the Eden plan."
The procedure suggested by Mr. Molotov to accomplish this
was embodied in a formal proposal "Oh the Establishment of a
Provisional All-German Government and the Holding of Free
All-German Elections." This proposal outlined measures for setting up an appropriate allGerman authority, so that the Germans themselves would run the elections, and called for withdrawal of occupation troops even before elections, to insure against
outside interference. Here in condensed form, itre his proposals
for the internal prerequisites:
T o recommend to the governments of the German Deme
cratic Republic and the German Federal Republic immediate
convening of a conference of authorized representatives from
each to work out procedures for establishing a provisional allGerman government.
The chief task of the provisional all-German 'government
to be the preparation of a draft electoral law insuring participation of all democratic organizations; to verify and to insure existence throughout Germany 'of conditions re uisite for
holding of democratic elections under conditions o genuine
freedom, precluding pressure from the big monopolies on the
voters, and to hold these elections without outside interference.
The provisional all-German government shall also represent Germany in preparations for the peace treaty and in international organizations; prevent Germany being drawn into
military alliances; insure free activities of democratic parties
and elections and prevent existence of fascist, militarist or other
organizations hostile to democracy and peace; undertake the
development of economic, trade and cultural relations between East and West Germany, questions of transport and
communications and free movement of people and goods
throughout Germany and other questions pertaining to interests
of the nation as a whole.
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All this, declared Molotov-

". . . would make it possible to hold all-German elections

in the immediate future under conditions of freedom. Thereby
Germany would receive the opportunity to convene an allGerman constituent assembly, elected in free elections. This
all-German parliament would form not a provisional government, but a government enjoying full rights and resting on a
democratic constitution. . .

.
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As for external prerequisites to insure peaceful and democratic
development of a unified Germany, he declared that the Paris
Agreement on the participation of Western Germany in the E w e
pean army is incompatible with the interests of national independence of a unified Germany, and the policy of imposing on West
Germany agreement on the European Defense Community would
have to be abandoned, since the fifty-year provision would mean
iu extension to Eastern Germany as well.
Mr. Molotov emphasized that the withdrawal of occupation
forces, provided for in the Soviet proposals, was of particular importance:

'To preclude any pressure on the elections by occupation
authorities, it is n e c e s s y even before the elections are held,
to withdraw the occupation troops from the territory of Eastern and Western Germany. In this case only limited contingents of troops could remain on the territory of Germany which
are necessary *for carrying out security functions arising from
the control tasks of the Four Powers: for the USSR-with regard
to Eastern Germany; for the United States, Britain and France
-with regard to Western Germany."
A final objection to Mr. Eden's draft, said Molotov, was that
it would lead to endless disputes regarding the "five stages," while
the most important point, as for example the peace treaty, would
only begin at the third stage, whereas under the Soviet proposal
peace treaty negotiations could be started at once:
"The establishment of a provisional all-German government will mean that the democratic forces of Eastern and
Western Germany can begin already today to work for the
genuine unification of Germany. The Germans must take the
preparation and holding of all-German elections into their
own hands. Our four governments must both trust and s u p
port them."
The charge made by Molotov at one point in the discussion
that the Western intention was to extend the Bonn regime to all
of Germany is bolstered by a report by J. Alvarez del Vayo in The
Nation for February 13. Mr. del Vayo sought out the Bonn dele-

gation headed by Dr. Blankenhorn (see page lo) at their West
Berlin headquarters to get an indication of their way of thinking.
He described them as
veteran career men. I remember when
some of them served under Hitler." Mr. del Vayo asked them
whether they would consider the idea of a committee of West and
East German experts to prepare elections, as an alternative to the
Westen plan, and reported their answer:

". . .
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"Not a chance, they said They reject any idea of
the two Germanys on a footing of equalit).. They see
fication of Germany as the simple absorpuon of East Germany
by Bonn."
Thus spoke the representatives of Adenauer, with whom the
Western three had coordinated all their plans, and who were in
West Berlin to see that there was no deviation from these plans.
Mr. del Vayo also had a talk with Erich Ollenhauer, chairman
of the Social Democratic Party, which has a large representation
in the Bonn Parliament. The Socialist leader gave him a further
insight into Adenauer's idea of free elections throughout Germany.
From Ollenhauer, as Mr. del Vayo wrote in The Nation for February 20, he learned:
"When the Socialists oppose Adenauer's policy on EDC and
his demand that the whole of East Germany, now consisting
of five Lander, be treated as a single Land in the plan for *future
reunification, they follow their principles but also fight to save
their awn skins. They see in this a new trick of the shrewd
Chancellor to maintain himself in power indefinitely. An
Anschluss of East Germany to the Federal Repu'blic under this
scheme would insure Adenauer a majority in the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat to the end of his days, keeping the Socialists
out of office and condemning them to the role of an eternal
and sterile opposition."
In his answer, turning down Mr. Molotov's proposal, Mr.
Dulles charged that Mr. Molotov had rejected elections "because he is afraid of them-he has reason to be." Mr. Molotov, of
course, had not rejected elections, as he had just finished making
quite clear. And if the Soviet Foreign Minister did fear the results of an expression of the people's will, why had he suggested
a national referendum to determine it, and for that matter, why
was Mr. Dulles so unwilling to submit the Western and the Soviet
plans to such a test?
Mr. Dulles further charged that Mr. Molotov's intention was
"a method of extending the solid Communist bloc to the Rhine."

The Secretary of State argued that the exclusion of "monqhlist,
militarist and fascist groups" is a "classical Communist concept
of elections." He seemed to have forgotten that it was also the
conmpt agreed to by the United States, British and French governments at the close of World War 11, brought on by those groups
in Germany. Thus, again, he underlined the Administration's
repudiation of the signature of the United States to the Yalta and
Potsdam agreements. Mr. Dulles charged that the " 'so-called'
Geman Democratic Republic was put in power and kept in
power by Soviet power," and that it would have been "forcibly
ejected from power by the workers, who in their desperation rose
up against it last June, but for Soviet armed force."
Mr. Molotov's answer to this last point was:
"Some people do not like the regime of the German De'mocratic Republic. We do not like the regime of West Germany.
But this is not the problem.
"The events of June 17 have been mentioned here. We
know that these events were arranged from without and that
they were carried out by foreign hands. . . These things have
been taken into account in the German Democratic Republic
and they could never be repeated. The reason they could
never be repeated is that they have no ground under them."

.

(This statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister finds confirmation in the complete failure of any of the provocative rumors circulated during the conference, about riots and troop movements
in Eastern Gemany, to materialize.)
Mr. Dulles concluded by saying that Mr. Molotov's words had
led up to "the ending of any defense of Western Germany, its
complete exposure to the vast forces that lie to the east."
Mr. Dulles seems to have forgotten that it was Nazi Germany
that invaded the Soviet Union and not vice versa.
The Secretary of State was again echoed by M. Bidault in the
latter's refusal to accept the legitimacy of the German Democratic
Republic as holding any mandate from the people, though he did
not seem concerned that he held no mandate from the people or
the parliament of France in the position he had himself taken
at the conference. He suggested that it would be quite impossible
for the representatives of Bonn to sit down at the same table with
the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, thereby
in effect saying that Geman unification is altogether impossible.
M. Bidault finally, however, suggested as an amendment to the
Western election plan that commissions at each level might be
made up of a representative of the East German Government and
a representative of the West German Government and a neutral

'

i

,

'

'

!

who would act as arbitrator. There was no indication, however,
that this was advanced as a serious proposal.
Mr. Eden seemed to feel that perhaps Mr. Dulles had gone
a little too far. He insisted that the sole purpose of proposing
I "free elections" was to guard against Nazi revival. He said that his
government was ready to prolong its twenty-year non-aggression
- treaty with the Soviet Union, or to consider any other ways "in
which we could help resolve the Soviet Union's anxiety about its
security."
But he supported the other arguments against the possibility
of the two regimes in Germany reaching agreement. "I can imagine," he remarked, "there might be some difficulty over the allocation of portfolios." He went on:
n

"We will never turn our defensive alliance into aggression
against the Soviet Union. The basis of consent on whlch our
action depends, the will of our parliaments, the peaceful purposes of our eoples, all make this utterly impossible. None
of us would c aim that parliamentary institutions are an absolute guarantee against aggressive policies. Certainly not. [Did
some one in the wings whisper Greece-Kenya-Malaya-Burma
-Guiana?] But as parliamentarians of some experience, we are
entitled to say that you cannot in this day and age lead democracies into an aggressive war."

P

Before concluding the discussions on the German question, Mr.
Molotov proposed that all four m p y i n g powers take steps to
ease the economic position of Germany and create favorable conditions for the development of a peaceful economy and to improve the material position of the people. He reported that the
Soviet Government, as of January 1, 1954, had stopped collecting
reparations from the German Democratic Republic, handed over
without requiring compensation all Soviet enterprises in Germany,
and reduced occupation expenditures to a sum not exceeding five
per cent of the budgetary revenues of the GDR. Beside this, the
GDR had been freed from paying to the Soviet Union postwar
national debts, including debts incurred under external occupation expenditures since 1945.
The Soviet Foreign Minister proposed that Western Germany
be likewise freed of obligations.
Mr. Dulles was very derisive about Mr. Molotov's concern for
the economic welfare of the German Federal Republic, which, he
said, had shown phenomenal economic improvement. In this connection Mr. Molotov commented later:
"For some reason, however, he did not mention that the
rise of industry in Eastern Germany has reached a higher level

than in Western Germany. He did not mention the fact that
the number of unemployed has reached two million in Western
Germany and continues to increase. In Eastern Germany, however, there is no unemployment. Mr. Dulles evaded our proposal for reduci occupation expenses, but this is an important question. W y has it been possible in 1954 to reduce the
occupation expenses of the German Democratic Republic to 4.5
per cent of the budget revenue, while the occupation expenses
in Western Germany have risen to 34.4 per cent and amount to
9.6 billion marks?"

3

Molotov OffersEuropean Collective Security Plan

f

In his final summation of the Soviet position on Gennany,
Mr. Molotov said there had been no answer to Soviet proposals
which offered real possibility of concluding a peace treaty with
Germany this year.
Answering the points raised about reconciling the viewpoints
of the two German governments, he said, here at this table we have
not only different regimes, but different peoples-why should not
representatives of the same people be able to hold discussions?
There are states in Europe today where Communists and noncommunists participate in government-why not in Germany?
He emphasized that his government was opposed to a military
alliance for Germany with either the East or West.
Mr. Molotov reminded the other three Foreign Ministers that
the tasks of insuring European security had been connected with
the German problem in the agenda. A military grouping like the
EDC, of part of the European states opposed to others, could not,
he said, strengthen security, but on the contrary increased the
danger of war.
Reviewing the recent history of Europe, Molotov showed how
each time a military grouping had been set up another group appeared in retaliation, and that such divisions had brought about
the two world wars.
He noted that it was the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed by Hitlerite Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan, which had unleashed the Second World War, and recalled the words of former
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to the effect that though ostensibly
the pact had been concluded for self-defense against communism,
actually it was a preparation for further measures of armed expansion by predatory states. The North Atlantic Pact, he said, in
many respects resembles the Anti-Comintern Pact, since it is based
on the idea of setting up groups opposed primarily to the Soviet
Union and the People's Democracies, and the North Atlantic bloc
of powers, headed by the United States and Great Britain, are
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pushing forward plans for creating military groups in Europe, in
Asia, in the Pacific, as well as in the Near and Middle East.
He asked how the plans for setting up the EDC can provide
guarantees for the security of Europe as M. Bidault, Mr. Eden and
Mr. Dulles had insisted:
"Since Western Germany disposes of the greatest militaryindustrial and man wer resources, German militarism will
play a dominant ro e in the 'European Defense Community.'
Thus, by tying security guarantees for the Soviet Union with
the creation of the 'European Defense Community,' the Western Powers are placing the role of security guarantor upon
German militarism, a revival of which constitutes precisely
the chief menace to European security."

r

And how, he asked, as partners of a remilitarized Western
Germany, could the United States and Britain be the guarantors
of the security of the Soviet Union against attack by German
militarism?
The question had been raised that there was no alternative
to EDC. As an alternative, Mr. Molotov declared, there could be
a plan providing for the collective security of all the peoples of
tov referred to the inter-American treaty of mutual
assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, by the United
States and all the Latin American Republics. If there could be
such an inter-American treaty, why not a European collective secur-
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Mr. Molotov then formally submitted the proposal of the Soviet Government "On Safeguarding Security in Europe."
While the proposed 50-year collective security pact for all the
countries of Europe was widely reported, there was complete silence on the preliminary steps proposed by the Soviet delegation
to prepare the way for such a pact, although these were of farreaching importance, represented an entirely fresh approach, and
were a vital part of the proposal.
First of all, recognizing the difficulties of reaching agreement
on the German question at this time, Molotov proposed that the
Four Powers should not drop the problem at the conclusion of
the conference, but should continue their efforts to reach a peaceThen came the new and startling proposal-that occufxztion
troops of the Four Powers be withdrawn six months from now.
This proposal means the withdrawal of occupation troops
before $ere is a peace treaty and peaceful unification, while the
efforts to achieve them continues. Previous Soviet proposals had

been for the withdrawal of such forces only within a year of the
conclusion of the peace treaty.
Recognizing that there will still be many complicated problems between the two parts of Germany and among the Four
Powers, the proposal suggested that only limited contingents of
agreed-upon strength remain, with no occupation duties, but to
perform protective functions arising from the control tasks of
each of the Four Powers which must inevitably be continued
until the peace treaty is concluded. Each of the Four Powers would
have the right to move in their forces in case security in either
part is threatened, the USSR in relation to Eastern Germany, the
other three powers in relation to Western Germany.
The German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic would have their own police units for maintaining internal order and defense of frontiers, their number and arms to
be determined by agreement among the Four Powers.
With these measures undertaken to insure the neutralization
of Germany and to create better conditions for the settlement of
the German problem, the Soviet delegation proposed that the
Four Powers should take the initiative in convening a conference
of all European states to consider the conclusion of a treaty on
collective security, with appropriate guarantees against aggression.
It becomes clear on studying the above proposal why it was suppressed by the press, and apparently almost completely ignored in
the conference discussions. Wide dissemination of this proposal
would be too embarrassing a refutation of the charge of the Western powers that the Soviet Union is not anxious for a settlement
in Germany, wants to "hold on to Eastern Germany," and to keep
its occupation troops there indefinitely.
The second part of the Soviet proposal outlined the Soviet plan
to end the division of Europe into two hostile camps and create
an all-inclusive Collective Security System. The draft offered by
Molotov for A General European Treaty on Collective Security,
contained ten points, which we give in slightly condensed form.
The treaty to be open to all European states. After unification, the united German state to be a party, pending
that time, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Re ublic to be parties, enjoying equal rights.
2. The parties un ertake to refrain from any attack against
one another, from threat or use of force, and, in accordance with the UN Charter, to settle any dispute by peaceful means.
3. The parties shall consult whenever danger of armed attack against one or more, in view of any one of them,
1.
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shall arise, in order to take steps to remove the danger.
4. An armed attack in Europe against any one or more shall
be considered an attack against all, and each shall assist
with every means in its power including armed force.
5. Procedures for such collective efforts to be considered and
determined at an early date.
6. Information on activities undertaken or contemplated in
exercise of the right of self-defense or maintaining peace
in Europe to be sent immediately to the Security Council
in conformity with UN Charter provisions.
7. The arties undertake not to participate in any coalition
or alfiance or conclude any agreement, the purposes of
which would contradict the purposes of the treaty.
8. Periodical and when necessary special conferences of representatives of all parties to be held; a permanent consultative political committee, and a military consultative
body to be set up.
g. Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent
members of the UN Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security, the parties shall invite the governments of the United States and the People's
Republic of China to send their representatives to bodies
set up under the treaty, as observers.
10. This treaty not to impair in any way obligations in international treaties and agreements among European states
whose principles and purposes are in conformity with its
princi les and purposes.
11. The uration of the treaty shall be 50
- years.
-
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Mr. Dulles promptly rejected out-of-hand the serious and carefully thought-out Soviet proposals for a European Security Treaty,
and ridiculed the idea that there should be another conference to
discuss this issue. He remarked that he assumed the collective
security treaty would be in reality a replacement of the North
Atlantic Treaty, and then he continued with a fine air of magnanimity:
"The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European
countries should get together for their own collective security
without the participation of the United States. The United
States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intention
of doing so in the future."
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The Secretary of State declared that it was hot the United
States but the Soviet Union that had caused the present division
f
in Europe:

"It is a division between those who have not been absorbed
and the others who do not want to be absorbed. Whether or not
the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in
Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States. So far as the
United States is concerned, we are determined that we will
not be absorbed."
Both Mr. Eden and M. Bidault also rejected the proposal, declaring that the Atlantic Alliance and United States aid to Europe
were a vital part of the life of the West. Mr. Eden described the
plan as a "modern Monroe Doctrine" to break up NATO and
keep the United States out of Europe. (Some wondered why, indeed, Europe should not have its own Monroe Doctrine.) When
references were made to the blood and treasure spent by the Americans in Europe, Mr. Molotov expressed the gratitude of the Soviet
people for the aid of the United States in World War 11. With
reference to the objections about excluding the United States, he
reminded the others that the United States is also excluded from
EDC, to which it is not committed to supply troops.
Mr. Molotov indicated that while the EDC itself was incompatible with his collective security proposal, the question of whether it would mean the replacement of the North Atlantic Alliance
was subject to consideration.
Mr. Molotov urgently sought a real discussion on the substance
of his proposals, indicating there was nothing hard and fast about
them, and they were subject to revision. But the others were not
eager to pursue the argument.
Meager press comments on reactions in Europe (largely blacked
out by the press in the course of the conference) showed that a tremendous impact had been made by the Soviet proposals.
Don Cook in the New York Herald Tribune, February 1I , called
it "a major Russian diplomatic move of the post-war period."
Clifton Daniel wrote in the New York Times the same day
that many Berlin observers considered the Soviet security program
"the most important Soviet diplomatic move in years."
The Paris newspapers Combat and Le Monde were reported
as suggesting that "the idea deserves serious consideration."
The Munchester Guardian of February 11, according to Drew
Middleton in the New York Times of February 12, "differed from
the official position of the Foreign Office to suggest that the proposals put forward yesterday by Viacheslav Molotov . . . should not
be rejected without careful thought." The dispatch reported that
a similar view was expressed by some Members of Parliament.
Before the conference closed, Mr. Molotov, in order that ef-
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forts for German unification be continued, proposed on February
17 that the Big Four take steps enabling th; dermans themselves
to work out methods of cooperation between East and West Germany. To this end he suggested:
a :--=I
1.- The establishment of an all-German committee on cominemal, transportation, economic payments and frontier questions.
P. The establishment of a separate committee to develop cultural, scientific and sports relations between the two sections of
Germany.
In the course of the discussions Secretary Dulles had made
charges to the effect that there exists a much larger police force
proportionately to the population in Eastern Germany than in
Western Germany, and that they in fact represented armed contingents. Mr. Molotov on his part cited figures reported to him
of the West German police and border forces and their armaments,
as well as the number of German soldiers attached to them. The
Western representatives had given contradictory figures in their
replies.
T o clear up this matter, Molotov proposed that the four governments ascertain the actual strength of the police forces in both
sections of Germany, and reach an agreement on what the strength
of all types of police should be, and the extent of the armaments
they should be permitted to have.
This proposal was turned down.
The Western Powers also rejected the idea of all-German committees for the purposes suggested, indicating their preference for
such matters to be handled by the High Commissioners of the
Four Powers in Germany, rather than by the German people
themselves.
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i T h e Question of Austria
Drscussro~OF AGENDAITEM3: T h e
Austrian State Treaty.
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DULLES, Mr. Eden and M. Bidault had agreed in advance
that an invitation should be extended to Herr Leopold Figl, Austrian Foreign Minister, to participate in the Berlin Conference
when the question of Austria was discussed. Mr. Molotov had
readily agreed to this, regretting only that the same privilege had
not been accorded to representatives of the Western and Eastern
German governments.

After Herr Fig1 had made his opening statement regarding the
importance to his country of regaining its independence and concluding a peace treaty, Mr. Molotov welmmtd his presence at tht
conference, and said that the Soviet Union also attaches great importance to the conclusion of the treaty with Austria and the
establishment of Austria as a free and independent state. He at
once agreed to Herr Figl's request that payment for former German
assets in Austria be made in goods instead of dollars.
Referring to the lengthy negotiations which had already been
held over the treaty, Mr. Molotov declared that a major obstacle
to completing the draft of the Austrian treaty was the fact that the
United States and Britain had failed to fulfill their obligations
with regard to the Free Territory of Trieste assumed under the
peace treaty with Italy, and had actually turned the Territo~yof
Trieste into an Anglo-American military base. This could not be
overlooked by the Soviet Union which was concerned with preventing the same thing from happening in Austria.
Another cause of delay had been the separate submission in
lgrjn by the other Three Powers of the draft of an "abbreviated
treaty" with Austria, which ran counter to previously agreed-upon
decisions, ignoring the question of the democratic rights of the
Austrian people-almost two years having passed before this abbreviated treaty was withdrawn.
Mr. Molotov then made clear why the Soviet Union has all
along taken the position that a satisfactory settlement for Austria
is dependent on a peaceful settlement for Germany.
Asserting that the USSR believes there is every possibility for
reestablishing Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic
state, and for freeing Austria from Four Power control, Molotov
said that there must be safeguards; that it was necessary to include
in the Austrian Treaty an article preventing Austria from being
drawn into any military alliance directed against any country whose
armed forces took part in repelling Nazi aggression and in liberating Austria. This, he said, was bound up with the remilitarization
of Germany and the EDC.
We cannot forget, he reminded the conference, that German
militarism previously began with drawing Austria into military
blocs directed against other European peoples, using Austria's manpower and material resources for the aggressive purposes of German militarism. This was done through Anschluss (an actual
annexation bringing Austria completely under German domination) before the last World War, and any new attempts at Anschluss must be prevented.
Yet today, he continued, statements of press organs close to
the government of Western Germany and official spokesmen "ad-

vocate the ill-intentioned idea that Austria cannot exist independently and that she must be subordinated to Western Germany,"
and "West German monopolies are already carrying out certain
measures aimed at the\ gradual economic subordination of Austria." These plans, nurtured by West German militarists and
revanchists art!- also, Molotov asserted, supported by certain rep
resentatives of Austria's governing circles.
Conclusion of a pea& treaty with Gamany would, he said,
be the best guarantee against this. But since this question was unsettled, it was necessary for the Four Powers to take measures in
connection with the sealement of the Austrian question to prevent
Anschluss and insure Austria's independence. He added:
"The Soviet Government believes that all such measures will
become unnecessary and superfluous as soon as a peace treaty with
Germany is concluded."
Mr. Molotov proposed, therefore, that Deputy Foreign Ministers
be instructed to prepare within three months a final draft of the
treaty previously agreed in the main, in "conformity with which
Austria shall be restored as a sovereign independent and democratic state, shall be released from the control of the Four Powers,
while the existing machinery of control-the Allied Commission for
Austria and all its agencies-shall be abolished and the occupation of Austria shall terminate, adding to-this that Austria would
pledge not to take part in any military alliance or allow foreign
military bases or instructors on its territory."
For the purpose of preventing new Anschluss, Mr. Molotov
proposed postponing the complete withdrawal of troops of the
Four Powers stationed on the territory of the respective zones in
Austria until a German peace treaty is concluded; all foreign
forces to be withdrawn from Vienna with the abolition of the
Control Commission; the forces of the Four Powers temporarily
remaining not to be occupation forces, and not to interfere in affairs of Austrian Administration or in the country's social and political life. He proposed also that the Deputy Ministers be instructed to examine the question of Trieste in connection with the
Soviet proposal that it not be used as a military base.
It should be clearly understood that in this proposal Mr. Molo*
tov was asking that there be guarantees against Austria joining
any military alliance of either the Eastern or the Western powers,
and that limited contingents of the Four Powers remaining until
the conclusion of the peace treaty were to have no occupation functions whatever, but only defensive functions against German annexationist aims that had to be guarded against as long as the remilitarization of Gemany continued.
The k e e Western countries who, it will be remembered, had
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insisted on the continued occupation of Germany until m e rather
distant date, according to the five stages of their own plan, and
the presence of foreign troops on its soil for 50 years under EDC,
now reversed all their arguments in relation to Austria.
Secretary Dulles said Mr. Molotov's statement had given him
"a cold chill."
Referring to what he called the "poisonous proposals" of Mr.
Molotov, he said they would turn the clock back "to the darker
earlier period when by Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly
doomed to be forever the victim of alien occupation," although
it was exactly the prevention of such a situation that Mr. Molotov
had in mind. Mr. Dulles said that since the Soviet Union "was
responsible for blocking German unification," its proposal "would
mean the indefinite occupation of Austria, and that "by requiring
the withdrawal of all Allied troops from Vienna, while retaining
Soviet forces in the Soviet zone, the capital of Austria would thus
be left as a defenseless island surrounded by a sea of Russian soldiers," (quite ignoring the fact that Mr. Molotov had also proposed that limited troops of the other Powers remain in their
zones). Mr. Dulles declared that if the Soviet proposal were accepted "there would be not a free Austria but an enslaved Austria."
After emphatic comments from Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and
M. Bidault to the effect that a country could not be considered
independent with foreign military units on its soil, Mr. Molotov
made the following statement:
"We have been told that if some military units remain in
Austria it is equal to occupation. He who argues in such a way
must answer the following question. The United States of America has eight military bases in France. What is this? Is it an
occupation? In Italy it has several bases. In Greece, three bases,
and also bases in Norway and Iceland. What is this? Is this an
occupation? No one says this is an occupation. But truly
this is a liinitation of sovereignty.
"If the Four Powers reach agreement on the stay of some
limited troop contingents in Austria, it means no occupation
but a certain limitation of sovereignty dictated by necessities.
"Approximately loo American bases have been established
on or near European territory. We have to take interest in this
as we are here concerned about the security of our country and
other peace-loving nations. The European Defense Community,
which results in a birth of militarism in West Germany, has
been created.
"If the United States, France and Great Britain would write
off creation of the EDC, if they would write off revival of militarism in West Germany, the situation would become easier. .. ."
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Mr. Molotov said that the proposal' of' the 'Soviet delegation
would not, of course, solve the problem loo pa cent, but it had
been put forward as a temporary measure pending a satisfactory
solution to the German question which would prevent nmilitarization, and that it at least represented a practical step toward an early
solution of the Austrian question.
Herr Figl, of course, was anxious to have the question of the
peace treaty settled, and did not welcome the idea of any foreign
troops remaining in Austria. However, press reports showed that
his rejection was much less categorical than that of Mr. Dulles,
and had it not been for pressure £rom the West, the Austrian Government might well have been ready to accept an interim solution
that represented a long advance over the present rimation, toward
complete independence.
In the course of the discussion Mr. Molotov made several concessions. He offered return of the German assets held by the Soviet
Union in Austria "this very day." In view of Western offers to
agree to Russian versions of certain disputed points, he withdrew
his proposal that the Deputy Foreign Ministers take up consideration of the treaty where they left off last year. He abandoned his
condition linking Trieste with the Austrian treaty, proposing that
the Big Four refer this question to the United Nations Security
Council. He suggested that the point on limited troop contingents
might be reformulated, that it should be agreed to bring the matter
up for reconsideration in 1955.
The three Western powers, during the subsequent discussions.
hurried through an acceptance of all the remaining points in the
previous draft treaty which they had previously been reluctant to
accept, even those points particularly urged by the Swiet Union.
When Molotov was now told that since all the requirements
previously raised by the Soviet Union with regard to the treaty had
been met he should be prepared to sign it, he reminded the others
that the situation had changed since the draft treaty had originally
been drawn up, and that since that time plans for the remilitarization of Germany and the EDC had gone forward. The Soviet Foreign Minister agreed to sign if his proposals for limited foreign
troops pending the conclusion of the Geman peace treaty. and the
guarantees against Austria joining any military alliances were qccepted. As the other three powers refused to accept the new soviet
proposals even in modified form, the matter was left there.

The Conference Ends
ON FEBRUARY 18, the final day of the conference, the communique was issued announcing that agreement had been reached
on the holding of a conference with the Chinese People's Republic
at Geneva on April 26: (See page 53)
The important thing was that the pressure of the people of the
world, their longing for a peaceful settle'ment in Korea, for an end
to the fighting in Indo-China, and for further efforts at agreement
among the Big Powers, had compelled those who were reluctant
to have further conferences, to continue their negotiations, and that
the realities of the situation had compelled a recognition of the fact
that the 500,000,000 people of China had to be represented at
negotiations.
3, ..R
In his final words, Secretary of State Dulles expressed regret that
the conference had failed to satisfy the hopes of so many throughout the world. He declared that the failures were not due to lack
of effort, but to "a fundamental difference between the views of
the East and the West.
." "All our differences," he said, "have
revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed
safe, to give man and nations a genuine freedom of choice. The
Western Powers were willing to place trust in the German and
Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not." He blamed the
Soviet Union for failure to achieve the unification of Germany:

..

"Our discussion of European securit has revealed that the
Soviet Union believes that its security epends upon maintainipg such a huge preponderance of power that every other country of Europe will in fact be subject to its coercion."
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(How strangely similar to words with which Dulles has at other
thnes and places described American foreign policy!)
Mr. Dulles acknowledged that positive results had been achieved
in the arrangements to hold the Korean political conference and
to discuss the restoration of peace in Indo-China, and in the decision to pursue the search for agreement on arms reduction. He said:
"In addition to what we have done here, we have learned
much that has a value which is not to be ignored. I t makes it
less likely that any of us should by inadvertence or miscalculation do what would risk another world war."

If that indeed has been accomplished, no single more important
result could have emerged from the conference, although Mr. Dulles rather spoiled the effect by insisting that the Western nations
would go right on with their plans for "what strengthens freedom,"
(read EDC and rearming Germany).
The Secretary of State concluded:

"I thank each of my three colleagues for the clarity and candor of their artici ation in this conference and for the uniform
courtesy an consii! eration which each has shown me."

$

The Soviet Foreign Minister opened his final statement with the
comment that the conference had led to a better understanding of
the positions and differenas of the nations npnsented and of ways
to lessen these differences.
Mr. Molotov noted that agreement had been reached to take
steps toward a fair solution of the question of disarmament, or at
least a considerable reduction in armaments.
He termed the decision on a conference to discuss a final settlement of the Korean question and of the restoration of peace in
Indochina as a contribution to strengthening peace.
He felt that the discussions of the German problem had shown
that a solution of this question is inseparably bound up with the
problem of security in Europe, and that this meant Germany must
be reunified on a democratic and peaceful basis, with no revival
of militarism permitted; that the conference made dear that the
solution of the-~errnanproblem is a matter for the German people
themselves and the Soviet representatives were convinced that if
they had been heard it would have been easier to find a solution.
He expressed the hope that efforts for a peace treaty and peaceful
unification of Germany would be continued by the Four Powers.
Without entering into recriminations as io where the responsibility for failure on the questions of Germany and Austria lay,
Mr. Molotov declared:
"The Soviet Government has never made a secret about its
rejection of the creation of military groups of these or those
countries directed against other states. The Soviet Government
cannot help pointing out the particular dangers of such a military group as the European Defense Community, formation of
which means the rebirth of German militarism."
It was for this reason, he said, the Soviet Union had submitted
its proposals for an all-European treaty of collective security, which
non-European states could help to bring about. He felt that the
Austr$an question could have been solved.

In conclusion, the Soviet Foreign Minister said the following:
"The conference contributed to the discsusion of some international roblems, the solution of which is necessary for the
further re axation of international tension. The problems which
could not be solved at the Berlin Conference are not wiped off
the agenda.
"The Berlin Conference, we hope, will contribute to the
development of cooperation of nations in international relations
in the interests of the strengthening of peace."
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Mr. Molotov expressed the gratitude of the Soviet delegation
for the cooperation of the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
France and Britain at the conference. He also thanked all the staff
members of the four 'delegations for their good and speedy work
during the conference.
On the day following the conclusion of the Berlin Conference,
the three Western Powers, the United States, Great Britain and
France, following their usual custom, issued their own special communique. They did not even mention the most important achievement of the conference-the agreement on a conference at Geneva,
including the Chinese People's Republic. They laid the entire
blame for failure to reach agreement on questions of German reunification and an Austrian treaty at the door of the Soviet Union. The
communique declared: "The Three Powers do not intend to be
deflected from their efforts to develop the system of defense on
which their survival depends" (i.e., the European Defense Cornmuni ty.)
In a statement summing up the results of the Berlin Conference
published in the Moscow Pravda on March 5, Foreign Minister
Molotov emphasized again the Soviet position that the settlement
of the German problem now hinges on the fundamental problem:
"to revive or not to revive German militarism." Stressing the consistent adherence of the Soviet Government to the principle of
peaceful c ~ x i s t e n c eof states with different social systems, he wrote:
"We believe that despite the difference in the social systems
of the European countries, for exam le, all the European peoples are interested in preserving anBstrengthening peace. We
wish that in the question of safeguarding peace there should be
no two camps in Europe as well as throughout the world. We
call upon the European states to abandon the creation of military groups op sed to each other, since the creation of such
oups cannot K t lead to war. Instead we propose the estabRiament of a simple corn* of all European states striving to
safeguard their security and strengthen peace in Europe. In this
system of European security no state, even a strong one, should
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hold a dominant position. The sovereignty of each knd every
one of the participants of this collective security system should
be ensured and safeguarded against any external encroachments. *:
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The Soviet Foreign Minister declarcd that the results of the
Berlin Conference should not be over-estimated, and would become
more clear only as a result of the Geneva Conference. The important point, he said, was that the long break in Great Power conferences had come to an end, that a number of questions had been
clarified, and that the Berlin Conference paved the way to a conference that would include the People's Republic of China and
other powers, as well as those who had met in Berlin. He stressed
the determination of the Soviet Government to continue its efforts
to ;educe international tensions and strengthen peace.
the door to continuing negotiations is open. It is our duty as
Americans to do our part to see that it is never closed. Through it
lies the only way to peace for America and for the world.

Communique
O n the Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers
of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and France.
I
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= The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, John Foster Dulles,
/ ' Viacheslav M. Molotov, Anthony Eden and George Bidault, took
place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954. They
reached the following agreements:
A. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France, meeting in Berlin,
Considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a
united and independent Korea would be an important factor in
reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts
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1 Propose that a conference of representatives of

the United States,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
France, the People's Republic of China, the Re ublic of Korea,
the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, an% other countries

whose armed forces participated in the hostilities in Korea and

which desh to attend shall meet in Geneva on April 26, 1954 for
the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean
question,
Agree that the problem of restoring p a c e in IndoChina will
also be discussed at the conference to which representatives of the
United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. the United
T m , France, the Peo le's Republic of China, and other intera t e states will be invitecf
I t is understood that neither the invitation to nor the holding
of the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been
accorded,
B. The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet
Sodalist Republics, the United Kingdom and France.
Convinced that the solution of international controversies necfor the establishment of lasting peace would be considerably
aide by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial
reduction of armaments,
Will subseq.uently hold an exchange of views to promote the
successful solutlon of this problem as provided for in Paragraph 6
of the United Nations Resolution of November PS, 1953,
The four ministers have had a full exchange of views on the
German question, on the problems of European security and on
the Austr~anquestion, but they were unable to reach agreement on
these matters.
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APPENDIX

Two German Governments

In the course of the Berlin discussion on Germany, the Western Powers made frequent charges
to the eflect that the Federal Republic of Bonn, in
the West, is truly representative of the people of
Germany, while the German Demomtic Republic
in the East is not. So that readers may draw their
own coficlusions ma this and other aspects of the
discussions on Germany, we are giving certain data
about the two regimes. S w e limitations prewent
adequate treatment of the manifold developments
of post-war Germany, but this material will s u m
to rndicate main policies and trends.

German Federal Republic
Area 94,705 square miles
Population q 8 ~ 7 8 m(1959)
Founded May ng, lgqg (effective Sept.
1, '949)

Before the ink dried on the Potsdam agreement, preparations were
made to boycott its application in the
western occupation zones of Germany.
Alt the London Foreign Ministers
Conference this was realized. The
delegates of (the United States, Great
Britain and France rejected any proposal that would have saved German
unity. On Dec. 40, 1947 the N t u York
Herald Tribune wrote: "The division
of Germany will give us a free hand
to include West Germany in a system
of Western states.''
Under the separate West German
Government set up at Bonn under
Western auspices, the Potsdam agreement on decartelization was abrogated.

The Krupp h n and steel empire haa
been revived, the big industrialists who
financed Hitler are back in power,
the Ruhr b being restored as a base
for war industries.
American capital had an enormous
share in German industry. In 1951 the
Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut in Berlin estimated American participation
in the German -economy at I .4 anillfan
marks. The actual influence of US.
capital is estimated at twice that sum.
According to a recent estimate of
the Infomtionsdicnst Ruhr, no per
cent of all industrial enterprises in the
Ruhr are in foreign hands, the majority of which are controlled by Awrican firms.

It is generally acknowledged that
denazification was never carried out
in Western Gemany and that dfication is a fact. This was the inevita-

ble result of the decision to rearm
Western Germany and recreate it aa
a "bulwark against communism," follaving Hitler'r own pmgram. Major
Nazi war criminals have been released
and hold high positions.
Former Nazi Party tnembers have a
majority of jobs in @he Bonn foreign
ministry. Dr. Peter Pfeiffer, former
Nazi, was appointed to q m m t the
Federal Republic as UN observer.
Among the members of parliament's
"European Defense Community Committee," which rightfully should ~bc
called "Committee on Armed Snvices,"
are Hitla's ex-admiral, Hellmuth
Guido Alexander Heye, a - p e r a l
Hasso von Manteuffel and Hitler's
excolonel, Alfred Burghmister. Such
examples could be multiplied manifold.
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The New York Times of Jan. 17,
1954 wrote: "An examination of the
files of the Nazi party here (in Berlin) shows that four of the eightem
cabinet members in Bonn were actual
."
members of the party.
Waldemar Kraft, Minister without
Portfolio, was a Major in the SS and
guilty of war crimes in Poland; Viktor Emmanuel Preusker, Minister of
Housing, former member of the SS,
and instructor in racial questions for
that organization; Gerhard Schroeder,
Minister of the Interior, joined the
Nazi party in 1933, is now on the
All pretense of demilitarization has Board
the Hapfound^ and l e k l
long abandoned. The corn-rive London Economist wrote recently: the "North West German Foundq
and Mining Federation," owned by the
he backgmund of Dr.
One of West Gerright wing coalition partners are gen- K1oeckner
~
industrial unerals who belime [that the Nazi New m a n ~ 'patest
dertakings:
Robert
Tillmanns,
MinisEuropun Order and the v i ~ n gDivision & the waffen were the w e b ter without Portfolio, had been sent' *en
years
for the anti-Communist Europe of
by a U.S. court at Nuremberg in 1947
tomorrow."
War
charges; Pram BlucCha,
W i h h e p-ng
of the m&tutional
desring the way for Minister for Economic Cooperation,
lo 7 yam i m p r h n m t
co-iption
and open rearmament on Was
an
M i l i m ~w r t ; he
Feb. 86, 1954, "hTheador Blank
om;,
unoffidal wnr min- now chairman of the Free Democratic
Party.
istry, came into its own.
Even before the September elections
which gave Adenauer a majority in M n g S-dc~ds
the Bundestag, this office had grown
According to a study by the Trade
to be the largest ministry of the Bonn
government with g ~ employees.
o
Even Union Institute of Economics in CoWore the conscription law was passed, logne, in June 1948, 83 per cent of the
70,000 Germans were under arms in national income was in wages and
the British zone as members of a salaries, 17 per cent in profits. By
"German Service Organization" and December ~ggo,)the relationship had
changed to 35 per cent of the income
60,000 in a similar organization in the
American zone, called "Industrial Po- in wages and salaries, 65 per cent
lice." These battalions wntain up to profits. In January-February 1951,
85 per cent of former SS officers and 8n.6 per cent of the taxes were paid
by workers, 17.4 per cent by employmen.
Throughout Western Germany, 580 ers.
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military organizations and veterans'
organizations are reviving the Nazi
spirit; periodicals and boob glorifying
militarization are pouring from the
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According to a report issued by the
Social Democratic Party of West Germany in September, 1958, cxwt of food,
clothing and household goods has increased by 50 to loo per cent during
Adenauer's regime, while wages have
increased only lo ,per cent since 1951.
Regarding unemployment, varied estimates average around x,ooom.

stag. Neo-Naxi gfot@f'-b*rted
Adenaua.
The West German police carried on
a relentless campaign of intimidation
during !the pre-election period. Thousands of opposition election workers
were jailed, election material confiscated and meetings prohibited.

West German Peace Forces

Elections, Sept. 6, 1953
In ,these elections the Bundestaglower house of the West German parliament-was elected and ,the rule of
Dr. Adenauer was at stake.
The U.S. Government, through
President Eisenhower's letter to Dr.
Adenauer and John Foster Dulles*
election speech on the eve of the voting, openly intervened on Adenauer's
behalf.
The forces behind Adenauer can be
recognized in the following list of
campaign contributions published on
April 98, 1958 i n the conservative
Munich weekly Die Deutsche Woche:
From banks and industrial enterprises, 8 million German marlcs;
funds of the Catholic Church, 1.5
million; from elections funds of the
Federal Government, o million; from
US. High-Commission sources. 6 million German marks.
Tens of millions of marks were given
by Krupp and other industrialists.
Adenauer won a clear majority in
the Bundestag and the total o p p i .
tion won only 8,800,000 votes. Who
really won the elections can best be
demonstrated by the stock quotations
in the table below.
Contributing to Adenauer's victory
were election regulations, heavily favoring the -majorityparties and depriving parties with less than 5 per cent
of the total vote of seats in the Bunde-

-

Siemens Electric . . . . . . . .
Kleeckner Stcel . . . . . . . . . . .
Harpener Mines .........

The strong sentiment for peace represents a strong obstacle to Adenauer's
goal of remilitarization of the German
people.
I
In a recent poll of young people,
by a West German public opinion
research organization in Bielegfeld,
British Zone, "Emnid," to the question, "Would you like to be a soldiery 71 per cent answered NO; a8
per cmt answered YES; i per cent had
no opinion.
Numerous trade union meetings
have opposed steps for the remilitarization of Germany and the conscrip#tion of the youth. Thousands of
women froan all parts of Western Germany pmtested the constitutional
changes allowing conscription.
During the Berlin Conference, people in all Germany spoke out for German participation, and for a peaceful
settlement of the German problem.
In all Catholic Churches in West Germany an appeal by the Conference of
Catholic Bishops in Fulda was read,
bidding all Christians to pray for
peace and unity. In the German
Democratic Republic more than g
million people signed an appeal to
the Conference for peaceful unification. Despite repressions against the
peace f o r m in the West, an estimated
3 million people from Wmt Germany
appealed directly to the Berlin Conference.

19-50
198.00
948.45

llPIc Weat German pcra movement,
as yet, is not unified. But nearly g million voters spoke against the Adenauer
Governanent in the elections last September, while further millions desiring peace were undoubtedly fooled
by AdenauaVs demagogy during the
election campaign, expoad b e d i ately after by his appeal for forcible
unification. Pretensions to democracy
were atposed by Adenauer's attempts
to impme government control on the
trade unions.
M a t important forces in the peace

movement in Western Gumany are:
Fairly large seaions of the clergy,
most prominent of whom is Pastor
Martin Niemoeller; the rank and file
of the Social Democratic Party; the
Communist Party; the Federation of
Victims of the Nazi Regime; League
of Germans, led by former chancellor
Dr. Joseph Wirth and Dr. Wilhelm
Elfes; All German Peoples' Party, led
by Dr. Gustav Heinemann, former
Minister of the Interior in the Adenauer Government and Helene Wessel,
leading member of the Center Party.

German Democratic Republic
Area 44,110 square miles
Population 17,313,700 (1949)
Founded October 7, lgqg

part of the People's Owned sector of
industry, which today accounts for
84 per cent of production.

The German Democratic Republic.
it should be noted, was not set up as
a separate gowmment in eastern
many until more than four months
after #theFederal Government had b m
set up at Bonn under the sponsorship
of the Western Powers and all efforts
for G~~~
unifiation had
unsuccessful.
indusvial
in the
had formerly
sovietzone 8 per
beloneed to Nyis Or War criminals
or had been engagd
in manufacture
war materials. =hest were
h a t e d without compensation by the
soviet authoritia. =his 8 per rmt
of East German industry employed 30
pa mt of the industrial workers and
employees and accounted for qo per
a n t of gross production. Of these mterprises 3,080 were converted into
People's Owned Industries. Two hundred o t h m , formerly administered by
M e t authorities as part of reparation payment, have all been returned
to the German people without cornpensation to the USSR and become

After the sumndap
membcra of
the Nazi party* war aiminals a d
Nazi activists hod to undergo d e - n d fiation prom din^* War
were tried before
war crimes
On
06, 19489 de-nazifiation in the Soviet Zone was declared
completed by order of the Soviet Occupation authorilties. After that day.
only war criminals and criminal elements of the Nazi parq wm tried
before special tribunals. Since then,
several amnesties have been declared
for former Nari party membem and
minor Nazi and Wehrmacht offi~ials,
On
the
that demrraac~ has
beem strengthened suffiumtl~to render
them hamless*

h d &?form
6,350 landed estates of more than
n5o acres were confiscated without
compensation-the so-called Junker estates. The more than 5,500,000 acres
gained were distributed to farm la-
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borcm, landless pasants, cmant farm- Front's program for a united, demoera, small farmers and immigrants. In cratic and peaceful Germany.
The candidates were chosen in facthis manner 385,000 new farms were
created, offering homes and livelihood tories and villages, in city blocks, coto mare ,than t
million men, wom- operatives and all other basic organizations of society. The candidates
en and children.
were subjected to close scrutiny by their
electorate and had to give a satisThe Government
factory account of their activities and
When tbe GDR was founded, the qualifications at numerous factory, orgovernment was formed with partici- ganization, community and village
pation of the anti-fascist bloc of po- meetings before their noanination was
litical parties and organizations like con6rmed.
94 per a n t of the eligible voters
the Free C a r m n Trade Union Federation, the German Womcn's League participated in the elections. 34,060
voters o p p d the slate of the NaThe p d c s of the National Front tional Front.
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on: ~&alist Unity Party (merger
of the former W a l Democratic and
Communist parties); Christian Democrats; Liberal Democrats; National
Democrats and Peasants' Party.
Leading members of the government
me: President, Wilhelan Pieck, Socialist Unity Party (SED), fanner joiner
and carpenter; Prime Minister Otto
Grotcwohl (SED), former leading Social Democrat, printer by trade; Depuity Prime Minister, Otto Nuschke,
Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
March 29, the USSR ended its occupation and declared the German Democratic Republic a Sovereign State.

Living Standards

O W a l Get.man statistics show that
the cost of living has fallen nearly
one-third since 1950. The Economic
Plan for 1954 provides another 5 per
cent wage increase and further price
cuts. Production of heavy industry is
scheduled to rise about 7 per cent;
consumers' goods production, 23 per
cent. There is no unemployment.
National expenditure on public
health increased from 5,800 million
marks in 1951 to 8,200 million marks
in 1955 and is still rising. The FiveYear Plan, to be completed in 1955,
calls for the erection of at least 040,Ekc~*tmr
in $he GDR
ooo dwellings and the speedy repair
of war damaged buildings. For 1954.
On October 15, 1950, the first elec- the sum of 764 million marks will be
tions were held in *the GDR. They provided from state funds for houswere based on the constitution of the ing. One-third of the 1953 state budmuntry, which provides that war get of the GDR was devoted to culpropaganda, every kind of incitement tural, social and health services.
against democratic organizations or officials, incitement to race-hatred, national chauvinism and religious intolerance are considered criminal offenses. A. Conditions in the GDR
Equally any action violating the equal
rights d the citizen is regarded as a
Prior to June 1953 a certain justified
criminal offense. People convicted of dissatisfaction grew in the GDR, parsuch crimes forfeit their right to vote ticularly among peasants and members
and cannot run for office.
of the middle class, but also among
The National Front, a federation of workers. This dissatisfaction was based
all political parties and people's or- on the government's attempt to deganizations, ran a joint slate of can- velop heavy industry at the expense
didates who would accept the National of consumer industries and to hasten

completion of the Five-Year Plan at
the expense of the peasantry and the
middle classes.
On June I 1, the Government of the
GDR issued a number d decrees to
amend this situation, including approval of state credits for private enterprise, and easing the tax burden
on peasants and small business.
The government also declared an
amnesty for prisoners convicted of
minor violations of People's Owned
property and guaranteed the return of
all their property to peasants and m a l l
business men who had fled to the west
because of high taxes. The peasants
were granted credits and other aid.
The people of the GDR showed
great satisfaction over the promises
for improvements of the living standards. The steps of the government of
the GDR also evoked a lively response
in Westan Germany, where large circles felt that these improvements would
make unification of Germany easier.

)r
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parts d the GDR, where i t had been
unleashed simultantously, were soon
brought under control by #the p a
pleh police and the Soviet occupation
aUthorities.
Everything pointed to the fact that,
taking advantage of the original demonstration, the riots were instigated
by foreign sabateurs and interventionists.
That such an uprising had bem
long in the making and carefully prepared had been apparent from a number of cases where activities of agents
acting on behalf of the West had been
discovered in the GDR. The most noteworthy of these cases was that of the
former Foreign Minister of the GDR,
Georg Dertinger, who, on Jan. 16,
1955 had been arrested on charges of
espionage for "imperialist espionage
agencies."
The West German group in charge
of these sabotage activities "behind
!the iron curtain" was the Eastern
Bureau of the Christian Democratic
Union with otlices in West Berlin.
B. Shution in West Germany
There is a wealth of material indicating the outside sources of the financing
rhese events occurred at a time and enmuragement for these sabotage
when West Germany prepared for the activities.
September elections, in which Aden"Many Western observers hem beauer's re-election and Gemany's ad- lieve," New York Times oompondent
herence to the European Defense Corn- Walter Sullivan reported on June q r d ,
munity were at stake.
"that the United Shtes propaganda
stntion in Berlin, RIM, played a vital
role in the events of the last week.
Some even go so far as to say that the
On June 16th building workers uprising would never have taken place
demonstrated in Berlin (eastern sec- but #forthis station's broadcasts which
tor) against a p r o p e d lo per cent both built up the spirit that precipiIncrease in production norms. A few tated the strikes and likewise, from
hours after the demonstration had 5 a.m. Wednesday, broadcast to all
rtarted, the government rescinded the parts of Germany details of plans for a
order. In spite of that the riots general strike."
started a few hours later. They were
Alexander Werth in the Nation, July
marked by infiltration of demonstrators I 7 , 1953, charged the "League of Gerfrom West Berlin, destruction of pub- man Youth and other trouble makers"
lic and People's Owned property, burn- with "staging the Berlin riots." This
ing of Soviet flags, murderous attacks League, the Bund Deutscher Jugend
(BDJ ) , was exposed in October, 1952,
on officials of the Socialist Unity
Party and kidnaping of East German by the Prime Minister of Hesse, in
West Germany, as a murder-terror
personalities to West Berlin.
The unrest i n Berlin and other gang, which had received financial
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: grants .from US. sourccs, and had
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marked many Social D m a b and
anti-Communists who opposed Bonn
policies, for assassination.
"X-Day" had been frequently referred to in the West German press as
the day for the "liberation" of Eastern
Genmany. Jakob Kaiser, Bonn Minister
for Internal Affairs, a ministry used as
a center for espionage and sabotage

against Pmt Gumany, A r k d with
nco-Nazis to recover East German
holdings. According ,to the French
Tribune des Nations, June 06, 1954,
Kaiser had arrived on June 18 in the
U.S. sector of Berlin, and late in the
day on June 17 boasted to newsmen
that the "movement" in East Germany
that day was led by "former Wehrmach~t&am."

Glossary of T e r m s
Data on various treaties and plans referred
to frequently during the Berlin discussions.

(Also commonly refewed to as the
North Atlantic Pact, North Atlantic
Alliance)
A twenty-year treaty signed in Washington, April 4, 1949, by the United
States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, United
Kingdom, Netherlands, De!nanark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, France,
Italy, and subsequently by Greece and
Turkey. Went into effect in July, 1949.
The signatories agreed that an attack against one is to be considered an
attack against all, and to give collective armed aid to the one attacked.
The signatories also agreed on a policy of intervention in internal affiirs
under Article 4 whiah provides for
consultation on action to be taken
"when in the opinion of any one of
rhem, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of
the Parties is threatened," thus opening the way for the use of the pact as
an instrument to put down internal
movements of the people, which could
be extended even to a peaceful change
by democratic process.
Called a "defensive alliance," the
treaty is universally recognized as a
military alliance directed against the
USSR. US. Senators who opposed its

ratification pointed out the grave constitutional issues raised by the automatic commitment for the United
States to go to war, without the consent of Congress.
The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial on April 5, 1949, declaring that
the Atlantic Treaty nullified the principle of the United Nations, called the
signing of the pact "the triumph of
jungle law over international cooperation on a world scale" and "a substitution of brute force for the human quality of reason."
In addition to the North Atlantic
Treaty, the US. system of military alliances directed against the USSR, includes the Rio Pact, with 38 Latin
American countries, the ANZUS Pact
~ t t hAustralia and New Zealand, the
Phillippine Pact, the Japanese Pact,
the Korean Pact (with the Syngman
Rhee Government of South Korea), the
Military Aid Pact with Franm Spain,
the US.-Pakistan Military Aid Pact,
and the US.-backed Turkey-Pakistan
Military Aid Pact, the latter two envisaged as part of a Middle Eastern
Chain of military alliances to link up
with the Far Eastern chain anchored
in Japan. These pacts, in addition to
military aid, provide for an ever-growing chain of US. military and air b e a
surrounding the Soviet Union.

NATO-Nortih

Ah&

Treaty Organization
The military organization established to implement 'the North Atlantic Treaty, consisting of a Supreme
Council of high level representatives of
the nations concerned and an elaborate
network of bodies for military preparations under overall United States
command. In July, rgqg, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act making military aid available to Atlantic Treaty countries.
In 1950, General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander
of the NATO integrated force supplied
by nations outside and inside of continental Europe, including the United
States, and established Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe near Paris. Present Supreme
Commander is General Alfred M.
Gruencher.
On March 8, 1954, it was announced
that the United States had contributed
$6poopoo,txm to NATO, while European nations have also contributed
large sums.
US. funds have gone for guns, aanmunition, troop equipment, naval vessels, aircraft including anodern jets,
atomic weapons, and upwards of loo
U.S. air and military bases in Europe
and North Africa. While original goals
are still far from realization, active
NATO divisions are now placed at 42.

Bonn Agrecment
The Contractual Agreement signed
by the United States, Great Britain and
France with the German Federal Republic at Bonn, Germany, May 06,
1950. In concluding this agreement,
replacing the Occupation Statute, the
three Western Powers, rejecting the
repeated proposals of the Soviet Union
for a Four-Power agreement on a peace
treaty and German unification, in effect signed a separate peace treaty with
the German Federal Republic. In so
doing, they put the stamp of approval

on a divided ~ e r m a n yand the rearming of its Western section, in complete
contravention of the Potsdam agrtement for a peace treaty with ~ & n y
and the nations that fought against it
in World War I1 and the setting up
of a unified, peaceful German state.
While the agreement, would technically end the $formal occupation of
Germany by foreign troops, it in fact
extends that occupation for the period
of the treaty by arranging for the continued presence of the troops of the
United States, Great Britain and
France and foreign military bases
on German soil, simply changing the
designation from "occupation" to "defense" forces. The treaty provided
for heavy payments on the part of
the German Federal Republic for the
support of these laces.
While in words the treaty gives
to the Federal Republic "full authority
over external and internal affairs,"
it in fact denies that sovereignty, and
places Western Germany in the position of a colony by the continued
presence of foreign troop with complete freedom of action and maneuvers, and by giving the Western Powers the right to interfere in its affaim
at any time through a clause empowering them "(todeclare a state of emagency over all or part of the Federal
territory" when they might decide circumstances required such action.
The Bonn Agreement provides for
the rearming of West Germany and its
integration into the European Defense Community set up in a separate
treaty, but considered, with it, as "a
single treaty complex," and hence does
not go into effect until ratification of
the European Defense Community by
the six nations included in the latter.

The European Defense Community
Treaty (EDC) aigned in Paris May n7,
1950, by France, the German Federal
Repu,blic, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

position among #the g
o
bwlved and the people of aU Europe
* i
Community
1
~ l r r has
. ~
!
prevented
zhis in the two years
This is the plan devised to meet since its signing. On January so,
the objections against bringing a re- 1954, Holland became the first gova m e d Western Germany directly into ernment to clompkte the ratification
NATO, by setting up a common inte- process. Ratification by the Wcst Gergrated European army of France, the man Parliament on Mar& 8, 1953 could
German Federal Republic, Italy, Bel- not become e k t i v e without an
gium, the Netherlands and Luxem- amendment to the constitution, which
bourg, to opemte under the North At- prohibits rearmament and conscription. An amendment permitting the
lantic Treaty Coanarand.
The plan provides for 18 German latter was rushed through the Bundedivisions which will be commanded stag (Lower House) by Chancellor
by the Geman generals who gained Adenaua following the Berlin Contheir battle experience under Hi tler, ference, over the opposition of the
and will join the unified staff o.£ the Social Democratic members. On March
European army. It pmvides for a com- IP, 1954, the Belgian Parliament ccnnmon budget, common armament pro- plated ratification. However, Belgium's
duction, mobilization plans, draftees Constitution will have to be changed
with an active service period of 18 to make it compatible with EDC rcmonths, and volunteers. On ratifica- quirements delimiting national sovation of EDC, Allied control of Wcst eignty over armed forces.
German armaments production will
be lifted.
The United States and Great Britain
This is the plan for merging Wcstare not t!hamelves parties to the
European Defense Community Treaty, ern Europe's coal and steel production
but they presided over i& signing, under a common authority, signed
and signed a separate declaration that early in 1951 by France, Belgium,
the United States and Britain would Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy and
regard any threat to the integrity and the West German Government and
unity of EDC as a threat to their own ratified by all six in 195s. Great Britsecurity and would station on the con- ain so far has refused to join. The
tinent of Europe "such forces as they plan, intended to form the economic
deem necessary and appropriate to basis for EDC, means the rebuilding
contribute to the joint defense of the of the Ruhr coal and steel industries
at the expense of the rest of Europe.
North Atlantic Area."
The military provisions of EDC are Under it a European steel cartel has
to ,besubject to the orders and control already started operations, despite lip
of the Supreme Commander of NATO. m i c e given in the plan to the
They are, in other words, to be the breaking up of monopolistic arrangeforces which an American gemera1 ments. (Schuman Plan also re£erred
already commands in Europe, plus a to as the European Coal and Steel
large German army, which is to have Community-ECSC),
quality of status with ofher armies,
but would inevitably assume a dominating role. (There has already been
This is lhhe plan for the h h a l
talk in Western Germany of expanding the I n divisions provided for up unification of Western Europe undcr
a multilateral treaty of Western Euroto st5 or even 60.)
EDC cannot became effective until pean states signed in 1950 setting up
the Paris Treaty has been ratified by a ~q-nationCoundl of Europe. Little
all six Ggnatory nations. Strong op- progress has been made .toward fed-

eration due .to the unwillingncm of
the countries involved to yield their
sovereignty. The main emphasis has
been on the building up of a community of heavy industry by the six nations involved in the Schuman Plan

and the creation of a ConMIidn army
under EDC, which are envisaged as
stepping stones toward the creation
of a more inclusive ,political and ewnomic federation of Western European
nations.

A Chinese Quaker Speaks ...
...

Indeed rhe feeling of liberaIn connection with lthe remark of try.
Secretary of State Dull- that "our tion and the feeling of solidarity in
moral sense" forbids diploanatic rela- support of the Central People's Govtions with the Chinese People's Re- ernment have got to be seen to be
public," we quote from a spetch, believed.
"Thousands of square miles of
"Christians in the New China," delivered before the Christian Peace desert land are being made producFactories, railways, schools,
Group in London, March t6, 1958, tive.
by Liao Hung Ying. Mr. Liao was hospitals, health centers, houses and
educated in English and American rest homes for the workers, nursery
missionary schools in China, then at schools and kindergartens, etc., are
Oxford, and had many years' expcri- being built by the thousands up and
People everya c e in religious work in China, with down the country.
the Quakers and the YMCA. He was where are getting education. Village
invited by the British Quakers to at- peasants are at tending schools. Begtend a Friends' World Conference in gars and loafers and prostitutes are
learning useful trades and regaining
England. Here are a few extracts:
Women are no
their self-respect.
"Under the People's O o m m e n t longer sold as s l a w or concubines or
the Chinese people are making such prostitutes; they are becoming judges,
rapid progress in ewry aspect of ,the mayors, engineers, trade union workYes, the real situation
national life that the whole situation ers, etc.
is breath-taking.
is dynamic and not static.
"All this means that the Chinese
"The relationship between the People's Government and the Christians people believe in a great and bright
(and adherents of all other religious future; they are determined that their
faiths as well) is an example of the children and all future generations
ly
material
growth in quality and quantity. Not shall have i n c r ~ ~ n g better
only is the support for tihe Govmmcnt conditions, better educational and culbecoming more widespread; it is also tural opportunities -for the full defar deeper and stronger than ever velopment of their ,personalities.
"It means that the Chinese people
before.
The ordinary Christians
gradually saw that the Government's have already started to build for soThis means that the
policy was for M o m of religious cialism.
Chinese people must have peace to
belief.
"In the past the majority of Chris- build, and build and build. This
tians were apart from the society in alone is the most powerful guarantee
The Chinese of peace. Building for socialism and
which they lived.
Christians are gradually gaining self- planning for war are contradictory
confidence and assuming new dignity in terans.
"The Central People's Governas Christian citizens of their coun-
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ment is the first People's goverllnlent

and that the cetltral truth of our religion, the Fatherhood of God and
of thrce or four thousand years. It the Brotherhood of Man, has a new
s our owrt government and for it meaning and reality to us. . .
we expect moral support and under"The revolution in China restored
standing sympathy from our fellow the dignity of lnan to the peasants
Christians in the \Vest.
311~1 workers ant1 other social outcasts
\tho constitltted 85 per cent of China's
"The Chinese Christians completely
support our government. This sup- ~>upiilationof nearly 5m,m,ooo. IE
port is not given blindly, but with this is not part of the work of estabt~nderstanding and enthusiasm, after lishing the Kingdom of God on earth,
study of the principles which influ- then nothing else is.
Most naenced the revolution and on ~ h i c h ttirnll) we feel jo)ful that now a t least
o u r Government is based.
. I n S5 per cent of our colllpatriots are no
our study of Marxis111 we find that longer lleasts of burden hut free men
and \i.omen.''
we have ever had in our whole histor?
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2/, plus

y3 = One World

A simple equation-a

profound truth.

To live a t peace with the peoples o f the world we
need to know them-their
aspirations and
achievements. Yet t o o often the news from onethird o f the world i s ignored or distorted in our
daily press.
But there is a magazine, the only American magazine which each month brings you authoritative,
reliable, documented reports and eye-witness
accounts on significant developments in the Soviet Union, People's China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, other people's democracies, the people's
liberation movements everywhere and how all
these affect our country's interests.
G e t the facts straight about vital areas of the
world.
Don't b e satisfied with p a r t o f the truth about
p a r t o f the world-get
the whole truth about the
whole world.
Read

N E W WORLD R E V I E W
$2 for 12 months

$1 for six months

23 W. 26 St., New York 10
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